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NATURAL RESOURCES AND NATURAL LAW 
PART II: THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Robert W. Adler* 
Natural Resources and Natural Law Part I: Prior Appropriation analyzed 
claims by some western ranchers, grounded in natural law, that they have property rights in 
grazing resources on federal public lands through prior appropriation. Those individuals 
advocated their position in part through civil disobedience and armed standoffs with federal 
officials. They also asserted that their duty to obey theistic natural law overrode any duty to 
obey the Nation’s positive law. Similar claims that individual religious beliefs override 
positive law have been made recently regarding a range of other controversial issues, such as 
same-sex marriage, public insurance for birth control, and the right to bear arms. Prior 
appropriation doctrine is consistent with secular natural law theory. Existing positive law, 
however, accepts prior appropriation for western water rights but rejects its application to 
grazing rights on federal public lands, for reasons consistent with secular natural law. Natural 
law doctrine allows citizens to advocate for change but requires them to respect the positive 
law of the societies in which they live. Separation of church and state also bars natural law 
claims based on religious doctrine unless those principles are also adopted in secular positive 
law. 
This sequel addresses claims from the opposite side of the political-environmental 
spectrum, that natural law provides one justification for the public trust doctrine, and that 
courts should enforce an atmospheric public trust to redress catastrophic global climate change. 
Although some religious groups have embraced environmental agendas supported by religious 
doctrine, public trust claims are secular in origin. Just as natural law provides support for 
prior appropriation, it supports the idea that some resources, such as water, wildlife, and air, 
should be held in common rather than made available for private ownership. From this 
perspective, the two doctrines merge into a single issue of resource allocation. Which resources 
are best made available for appropriation as private property, and which are best left in 
common? Natural law theory helps to explain the liberty and welfare goals that inform those 
choices. Positive law embraces the public trust doctrine with respect to some natural resources, 
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Natural Resources and Natural Law Part I: Prior Appropriation (“Prior 
Appropriation”)1 evaluated claims by some western ranchers,2 grounded partially in 
natural law, to appropriative property rights to federal public land resources. This 
companion article assesses similar natural law origins of the public trust doctrine, 
 
1. Robert W. Adler, Natural Resources and Natural Law Part I: Prior Appropriation, 60 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 739 (2019) [hereinafter Prior Appropriation].  
2. Because I do not presume these views to be universal or even a majority position among 
western ranchers, I referred to advocates for this position as “natural law ranch advocates.” See id. at 746–
747.   
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asserted from the opposite side of the political-environmental spectrum by 
environmental advocates. Those claims have heightened importance given litigation 
arguing that an atmospheric public trust obligates governments to combat climate 
change.3 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently ordered dismissal 
of one atmospheric trust case for lack of standing, reasoning that the alleged harm 
was redressable only by political branches of government.4 
Prior Appropriation concluded that, whether or not one accepts the validity 
of natural law in U.S. jurisprudence, it does not support private property rights in 
federal public lands based on prior appropriation.5 First, personal beliefs, including 
those grounded in theistic versions of natural law, cannot override duly adopted 
positive law. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prevents any 
asserted supremacy of religious beliefs over applicable secular law, without impairing 
an individual’s right to hold those beliefs under the Free Exercise clause.6 Moreover, 
a fundamental tenet of natural law is that, as members of an ordered society, 
individuals are bound to obey positive law even if they disagree with that law.7 The 
federal and state constitutions are the only means through which fundamental rights 
can be used to override positive law rules, and only through proper judicial process. 
Although there is a long tradition of using civil disobedience to protest perceived 
injustices, such as slavery, one must accept the legal consequences of that 
disobedience in order to employ the tactic.8 
Second, although the prior appropriation doctrine of water law has some 
natural law origins,9 all western states ratified the doctrine in their positive law,10 and 
the federal government sanctioned their authority to do so.11 With respect to grazing 
rights on public lands, by contrast, pursuant to its plenary authority under the 
 
3. For discussions of atmospheric trust litigation and the crisis of catastrophic climate change it 
seeks to redress, see Mary Christina Wood & Dan Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation: Making the 
Fossil Fuel Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate System, 45 ENV’T L. 259 (2015). 
4. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2020). Other courts have also dismissed 
cases involving public trust doctrine implications on atmospheric conditions. E.g., Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. 
State, Dep't of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1102–03 (Alaska 2014) (dismissing the case on prudential grounds 
but mentioning that plaintiffs make “a good case”); Chernaik v. Brown, 436 P.3d 26, 35 (2019) (finding 
no conception of the public-trust doctrine in Oregon to impose fiduciary duties on the state to protect 
against the effects of climate change).  
5. Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 804–05. 
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ….”). 
7. Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 755 n.70, 759 n.92, 779.  
8. Id. at 755–56, 779. 
9. Id. at 780–86.  
10. Id. at 789–93. 
11. Id. at 789–92. 
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Property Clause,12 the federal government rejected private property rights to federal 
grazing resources in favor of a license to graze and later a system of federal 
permitting.13 It is consistent with natural law for the federal government to categorize 
different public land and other resources for varying uses.14 
Finally, it is debatable whether natural law supports claims to property 
rights in federal lands and resources based on historical use. Some scholars believe 
prior appropriation was a positive law response to the inadequacy of natural law-
based riparian rights.15 If prior appropriation is a positive law doctrine, natural law 
cannot support prior appropriation rights to grazing or other public land resources in 
contravention of federal statutes and regulations.  
Although ownership and use of federal public lands is an extremely 
important but contentious issue that commands significant public attention,16 the 
question of the legitimacy and utility of natural law extends well beyond that realm. 
Similar natural law-based claims have been made in the context of a wide range of 
high-profile public debates, including same-sex marriage, public funding of birth 
control, and the right to bear arms.17  
Natural law has also been raised in the context of the public trust doctrine. 
Prior Appropriation noted that some advocates for broader use of the public trust 
doctrine for environmental protection, including climate change mitigation, cite 
natural law to support their claims.18 For example, what some courts and scholars 
 
12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States 
….”). 
13. Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 768-88, 789-93. 
14. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 803–04. This includes res commune or res publicum for 
resources believed to be most appropriate for common public use, such as national parks or wildlife refuges, 
and res nullius for resources such as water that can be made available for usufructuary rights so long as the 
corpus remains unimpaired or not substantially impaired for public uses such as navigation and fishing.  
15. See Richard A. Epstein, How Spontaneous? How Regulated?: The Evolution of Property Rights 
Systems, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2341, 2356-63 (2015); Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 799–801.  
16. See Kirk Johnson, Siege Has Ended, but Battle Over Public Lands Rages on, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 
14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/us/public-lands-bundy-malheur-national-wildlife-
refuge.html (discussing public land controversy in the west and its implications). 
17. Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 748–49. Some individuals have even objected to 
government requirements to wear masks during the COVD-19 pandemic because a mask would cover the 
“image of God.” See Ed Mazza, GOP Lawmaker Opposes Coronavirus Face Masks Because They Cover 'The 
Image of God,' HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ohio-masks-likeness-
of-god-nino-vitale_n_5eb0c6d6c5b62b850f90eb42.     
18. See, e.g., Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE 
FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 281 (2014); Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public 
Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. 
DAVIS. L. REV. 741 (2012); George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and 
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identify as Roman law origins of the doctrine, as summarized in The Institutes of 
Justinian19 provides: “By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the 
air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea.”20 Other 
environmental advocates assert inherent or fundamental rights to a clean and healthy 
environment grounded similarly in natural law, among other sources.21  
Environmental advocates cannot categorically reject natural law as a basis 
for property rights claims while simultaneously relying on natural law to support the 
public trust doctrine and other asserted environmental rights. To be consistent, these 
claims must be subjected to the same analysis and the same scrutiny as natural law-
based claims made by natural law property advocates. To be valid, either the claims 
must be supported by duly adopted positive law in ways that are not true for property 
rights in federal lands, or they must have a firmer grounding in natural law principles, 
while not being contradicted by applicable positive law.  
The purpose of this analysis is not to test the legitimacy of the public trust 
doctrine, any more than Prior Appropriation questioned the legitimacy of the prior 
appropriation doctrine. Prior appropriation clearly exists as a matter of the positive 
law governing water resources in the western states. The issue in Prior Appropriation 
was the extent to which natural law supports assertions that prior appropriation also 
applies to grazing and other public resources. Likewise, the public trust doctrine has 
existed in American law at least since the early nineteenth century.22 It is recognized 
widely in positive law (judicial, legislative, constitutional), but the scope, purpose, 
and substance of the doctrine remains disputed.23 The critical question is where and 
how the doctrine applies, and whether it should expand to situations not previously 
 
Natural Law: Emanations Within A Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 307, 341 (2006); Richard A. 
Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987). 
19. Some cases incorrectly identify the Institutes of Justinian as a source of law, as if this work was 
a formally adopted Roman legal code; it was actually part of a larger effort by Roman legal scholars, 
commissioned by Emperor Justinian in Byzantium toward the end of the Roman Empire (Sixth Century 
A.D.), to collect the body of Roman law into a single source. As such, it is more akin to a modern academic 
legal treatise or textbook than a legal code. See, e.g., Bruce W. Frier, The Roman Origins of the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 32 J. ROMAN ARCHAEOLOGY 641, 642 (2019); Ewa M. Davison, Enjoys Long Walks on the Beach: 
Washington’s Public Trust Doctrine and the Right of Pedestrian Passage over Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. 
REV. 813, 830–31 (2006). A recent analysis co-authored by a law professor and a Roman law historian 
critiqued the same error by legal scholars, as well as the degree to which citation to the Institutes greatly 
oversimplifies the Roman law origins of the doctrine. J.B. Ruhl and Thomas A.J. McGinn, The Roman 
Public Trust Doctrine: What Was it and Does it Support an Atmospheric Trust?, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3440244 (forthcoming 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2020)). 
20. J. INST. 2.1.1. 
21. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 798–804. 
22. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821); Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Penn. 1810). Including 
colonial cases and ordinances, the pedigree goes back even further. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 
17–18 nn. 68, 73 (identifying colonial court decisions applying English common law trust doctrine). 
23. See infra Section II. 
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recognized. This article evaluates the extent to which natural law supports such 
expansion but recognizes that any change must be implemented through positive law, 
via judicial evolution of the common law doctrine or by statute or constitution. 
This analysis also does not revisit the legitimacy of natural law relative to 
the predominant modern focus on positive law. That debate has been waged 
elsewhere.24 Rather, because some western property rights advocates and some 
environmental advocates both assert legal claims that are grounded in natural law, 
this analysis assumes the legitimacy of natural law as the source of some kinds of legal 
rights and obligations.  
Part I of this Article explores competing theories about the legal history 
and sources of the public trust doctrine, including common law, constitutional law, 
and natural law. Part II analyzes the public trust doctrine according to the principles 
identified in Prior Appropriation, and evaluates the implications of the natural law 
perspective for the future of the doctrine. This article concludes that natural law 
supports and is consistent with the public trust doctrine and provides flexibility to 
apply it to the atmosphere and other common resources not yet subject to public trust 
scrutiny. 
I. THE MULTIPLE ORIGINS AND SOURCES OF THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE 
A. Introduction 
Legal scholars have disputed the source and origins of the public trust 
doctrine extensively, without resolution.25 The debate came in the wake of a now-
famous article by Professor Joseph Sax urging courts to make more assertive use of 
 
24. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (defending legal positivism); LON L. 
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964) (defending legal realism). See also H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and 
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). 
25. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust 
Doctrine: What Really Matters in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004); James R. Rasband, The 
Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 
1 (1997); Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Some Realism About the 
Takings Issue, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423 (1995); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some 
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENV’T L. 425 (1989); Harrison C. Dunning, 
The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law, 19 ENV’T L. 515 (1989); James L. 
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENV’T L. 527 
(1989); Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing 
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 631 (1986); Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical 
Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. L. REV. 511 (1975). 
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the historical public trust doctrine to enhance protection of a range of public 
resources,26 and intensified after some courts heeded Profession Sax’s proposal.27 
At the more restrictive end of the spectrum, some believe the doctrine is a 
narrow element of property law applicable only to property underlying navigable 
waters, thus precluding further expansion to the atmosphere or to other resources.28 
Some scholars have proposed that the doctrine is incorporated into parts of the U.S. 
Constitution.29 Other authors root the doctrine in a lengthy and diverse legal history, 
from the Institutes of Justinian to Magna Carta to Anglo-American common law.30 
These legal theories have included the idea that the public trust doctrine has origins 
in natural law,31 or that the doctrine is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty.32 As 
shown below, the sovereignty claim flows logically from other tenets of natural law.33 
Others believe the precise source of the doctrine is less relevant than its ability to fill 
important gaps in positive law pending an appropriate legislative response.34  
The applicable sources of law governing the public trust doctrine may help 
inform issues such as the propriety of applying the doctrine to the atmosphere and 
other public resources other than navigable waters. They may also be relevant to the 
degree to which there is a “floor” on applicability of the doctrine in individual states. 
Those issues were raised by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Illinois,35 which upheld an action by the Illinois Legislature 
invalidating a previous grant to a railroad company of title to extensive holdings 
 
26. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 
68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
27. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (dry sand 
beaches); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (non-navigable tributaries); 
Kootenai Env’t Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983) (navigable lake). 
28. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y FORUM 1 (2007); Rasband, supra note 25; MacGrady, supra note 25; 
Lazarus, supra note 25; Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 239 (1992). 
29. See, e.g., Torres & Bellinger, supra note 18; Wilkinson, supra note 25; Epstein, supra note 18; 
Michael O’Loughlin, Understanding the Public Trust Doctrine Through Due Process, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1321 
(2017).  
30. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 26; Wilkinson, supra note 25; Smith & Sweeney, supra note 18; Hope 
M. Babcock, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV. 393 (2009). 
31. See supra note 18. 
32. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 3–7 (2013); Torres & Bellinger, supra note 18, at 
291; Wood & Galpern, supra note 3, at 263, 273–78. 
33. See infra Section I.E.4. 
34. See Babcock, supra note 30. 
35. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).  
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along the Chicago harbor. The Court grounded its holding in the historic public trust 
doctrine, but left unclear the source of law that applied, and whether the ruling was 
one of state or federal law.36 
The Supreme Court has since confirmed that each state has authority to 
determine the scope and applicability of the public trust doctrine in that state.37 The 
Court has never held, however, that states are free to abandon the doctrine entirely, 
suggesting that it has some minimum federal contours. These issues remain 
unresolved, in part because most state variations in the doctrine reflect policy 
differences regarding the geographic scope of the doctrine,38 or the resources to 
which the doctrine applies.39 No state since the Illinois Central case has successfully 
eliminated the doctrine40 or curtailed it as substantially as the Illinois legislature 
 
36. Plaintiffs sued in state court, but defendants removed to federal court because the case as 
pleaded involved questions regarding construction of a federal statute and federal constitutional claims. 
State v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 16 F. 881, 886–87 (N.D. Ill. 1888). The decision on the merits, however, 
did not ultimately turn on federal law. Although the Court decided the case on what ultimately appeared 
to be Illinois law, the case was decided nearly a half century before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938), holding that federal courts must defer to state courts on rulings of state law. 
37. Several cases post-dating Illinois Central confirm this result. See, e.g., PPL Montana, LLC v. 
Montana, 656 U.S. 576, 604–605 (2012); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988); 
Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370–71 (1977); Appleby v. 
City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926) (noting that “the conclusion reached [in Illinois Central] was 
necessarily a statement of Illinois law….”). The Court had reached the same conclusion before Illinois 
Central. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 661 (1891). At times, 
however, the Supreme Court has described the public trust doctrine as “American law.” E.g., Idaho v. 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284–86 (1997). 
38. See also Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: 
Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOL. L.Q. 53, 58 
(2010) [hereinafter Western States' Public Trust Doctrines] (describing considerable variations in public trust 
doctrine among western states); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust 
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 25 
(2007) [hereinafter Eastern States' Public Trust Doctrines] (finding wide variety of public trust doctrines 
among eastern states). Compare Barney, 94 U.S. at 325 (following Iowa doctrine that property adjacent to 
navigable waters extends only to high water line) with United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 
53, 61 (1913) (applying Michigan doctrine that technical title extends to middle of stream beneath 
navigable waters).  
39. See cases cited supra note 27; see also Eastern States' Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 38, at 16 
(explaining that eastern states treat oceans, coasts, and Great Lakes differently than other “navigable 
waters”); Western States' Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 38, at 78 (examining how western states assign 
states property interest in not only the bed of navigable waters, but in the water itself). 
40. The Arizona Legislature attempted to do so by statute regarding most navigable waters, but 
that statute was invalidated based on the public trust doctrine and the Arizona Constitution. Ariz. Ctr. 
for L. in the Pub. Int. v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 168–69 (Ariz. 1991); see also San Carlos Apache Tribe v. 
County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999); Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727–29 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
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attempted to do in the original railroad grant before a subsequent legislature revoked 
the grant.41  
Ultimately, there is some truth to all of the above theories. The public trust 
doctrine has roots in both the civil law tradition of Western Europe dating to the 
Roman Empire and in the Anglo-American common law tradition. Its principles are 
consistent with those attributes of natural law that help explain the evolution of 
Anglo-American law. The public trust doctrine reached into colonial common law 
and statutory law; state constitutional, statutory, and common law; and federal 
constitutional, statutory, and common law. Rather than arguing for the dominance 
of one source or another, a more fulsome analysis and explanation of the public trust 
doctrine requires an explanation of how each source of authority fits together. Such 
an integrated analysis, however, should begin with an exploration of the historical 
roots of the doctrine. 
B.  Historical Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine 
There are at least two major historical foundations of the American public 
trust doctrine. One is the civil law tradition of the Roman Empire and parts of 
Europe thereafter. The other is medieval English law, embodied in Magna Carta and 
later statutes, which some argue simply restored what the English nobility and 
commoners viewed as their common law or “ancient” rights pre-dating the Norman 
Conquest. The relationship between those roots—and whether and how they 
intersect—is less clear. The history and details of both sources, and the degree to 
which they influenced American judges and legislatures, also remain disputed and 
unclear.  
American common law began with the baseline of inherited English 
common law at the time of colonial settlement, but every state was free, through its 
judicial process, to modify that law as appropriate to its circumstances. Both Roman 
law and English common law have been invoked in state and federal jurisprudence 
and cannot be ignored as an influence on the development of the American doctrine. 
The more salient question is the extent to which this history should be considered 
when deciding the future scope and substance of public trust cases. 
1. Roman Law 
Most American courts finding public trust doctrine roots in Roman law cite 
to a brief summary statement in the Institutes of Justinian: “By the law of nature these 
things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea and consequently the 
 
41. In a case somewhat similar to Illinois Central, but involving only the right of a railroad company 
to wharf out over extensive sections of Lake Erie, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed that the state, as 
trustee, may not abandon its trust obligations over significant portions of a navigable waterway. State v. 
Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 94 Ohio St. 61, 78–80 (1916).  
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shores of the sea.”42 This was the first in a series of general rules categorizing various 
kinds of property as common, private, or public.43 As explained above, the Institutes 
were not a legal codification, but a legal textbook commissioned by Emperor 
Justinian in Byzantium, compiling earlier Roman law and accompanying a detailed 
Digest of Roman legal cases and other authorities.44 
Law professor J.B. Ruhl and Roman history professor Thomas A.J. 
McGinn recently critiqued, in a detailed and nuanced analysis, what they view as a 
gross oversimplification of the degree to which both proponents and opponents of 
public trust expansion analyze the influence of Roman law on the American 
doctrine.45 Roman law governing ownership and access to rivers, seashores, and other 
public resources developed over a period of centuries and was considerably more 
complex than was reflected in the simple proclamations in the Institutes.46 Ruhl and 
McGinn suggest that at least two Roman doctrines of property law, the res communes 
omnium (“things common to all”)47 and the res publicae (“things in public use”),48 
provide support for the public trust concept. These doctrines, they conclude, may 
have influenced later jurists on this issue49 and provided an historical foundation for 
what became the American public trust doctrine, although not as directly as some 
advocates suggest.50 
Even if Roman law addressed issues analogous to the modern public trust 
doctrine, by what pathway did it influence English or American jurists? Europe was 
in legal and political chaos during the centuries following the fall of the Western 
 
42. J. INST. 2.1.1. 
43. Id. at 2.1.1–2.1.6. Section 2.1.2 provided: “rivers and ports are public; hence the right of fishing 
in a port is common to all men.” Ensuing sections addressed riverbanks (2.1.4), and the seashore and the 
sea (2.1.5).  
44. See supra note 19; Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 121. Some scholars believe nevertheless 
that this codification of centuries of Roman law was one of the most important contributions of the Eastern 
Roman Empire. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY xvi, 373, 381 
(1945). 
45. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 126-132. Earlier efforts to critique the asserted Roman 
origins of the doctrine included MacGrady, supra note 25; and Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and 
the Public Trust: An Historical Perspective, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976). In fairness to Sax, in his seminal 
article, he acknowledged that the status of Roman law on this issue was “very confused.” Sax, supra note 
26, at 475. 
46. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 145-175; see also Frier, supra note 19, at 642–47. The 
Roman Empire, of course, went through multiple systems of governance. 
47. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 145. 
48. See id. at 168.  
49. See id. at 168-172. 
50. See id. at 176-178. 
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Roman Empire.51 Law and governance—to the extent it existed effectively at all—
reflected persistent power struggles between the Roman Catholic Church, the Holy 
Roman Empire, emerging free city states, and monarchies that competed for power 
until the rise of nations such as France, Spain, and England.52 Scholars have long 
debated the nature and degree to which continental civil law from the Roman law 
tradition, and closely related canon law, directly influenced medieval English law, 
including Magna Carta and the rights it sought to protect.53 Roman and canon law 
were used prominently in England in the thirteenth century.54 Any argument that 
the Roman law public trust doctrine proceeded in a straight line to England, however, 
would require more specific tracing and evidence.  
Moreover, in medieval feudal law and government in continental Europe, 
sovereignty and “public” ownership were vested in monarchs and the lesser nobility, 
not in the people at large.55 The nobility often retained for themselves exclusive 
franchises in fisheries and other public resources or granted those rights to favored 
subjects.56  
Nevertheless, Roman law did not simply disappear in the medieval period.57 
Scholars have documented public trust concepts deriving from Roman law in the 
laws of medieval kingdoms and the evolving European nations,58 although none 
 
51. See generally RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 366–75; NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE 
WEST AND THE REST 16–17, 257–59 (2011); see also THOMAS H. GREER & GAVIN LEWIS, A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD, 139–177 (6th ed. 1992). 
52. See GREER & LEWIS, supra note 51, at 209–14; RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 301–07, 478–87); 
Lorenzo Zucca, A Genealogy of State Sovereignty, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 399, 399–400, 401–02 
(2015); Anne Orford, Jurisdiction Without Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Responsibility to 
Protect, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 981, 981, 984–89 (2009).  
53. See Thomas J. McSweeney, Magna Carta, Civil Law, and Canon Law, in MAGNA CARTA AND 
THE RULE OF LAW (Daniel B. Magraw Jr., Andrea Martinez & Roy E. Brownell II eds., 2014) 281, 282–
83 (“The degree to which Roman and canon law have influenced the Anglo-American common law is a 
question that common law lawyers have been debating for a long time ….”). 
54. See id. at 306. 
55. GREER & LEWIS, supra note 51, at 215–223 (explaining land ownership by kings and lords 
rather than the people at large); STEWART C. EASTON, THE WESTERN HERITAGE 205–209 (Holt & 
Rinehard and Winston eds., 1961) (explaining peasants’ use of land and duties owed to a lord); Michael 
Dillon, Magna Carta and the United States Constitution, in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra 
note 53, at 81, 83. 
56. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 49–50 (1821); Dillon, supra note 55, at 83.  
57. See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 302 (preservation of the Roman tradition in Italy, particularly 
among the lawyers), 369 (preservation of Roman law by Gothic kings), 429–31 (reliance on Roman law 
by Holy Roman Emperors in twelfth century), 445 (promulgation of legal code derived from Roman law 
by Emperor Frederick II in thirteenth century). 
58. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 429–30 (Spain and France); Lazarus, supra note 25, at 
633–34 (Spanish legal codes and others); MacGrady, supra note 25, at 534–45 (Visigoth code, Spanish 
code, French law and codes).  
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appear to trace those continental codes directly to England. Moreover, legal scholars 
and theorists continued to write about Roman law concepts of res communes omnium 
and res publicae throughout the medieval period and through the seventeenth century 
work of Grotius,59 a leading natural law theorist of the Enlightenment.60 Details of 
continental public trust law varied, just as the doctrine varies from state to state in 
the United States.61 The underlying concept however, was consistent: recognition 
that some portions of the earth should remain in common. 
2. Medieval English Law 
It is possible that William the Conqueror imported some aspects of public 
trust law to England in 1066 as part of continental feudal law, which borrowed from 
Roman law.62 Some scholars have identified a contemporaneous (eleventh century) 
French statute purporting to guarantee open access to “public highways and byways, 
running water and springs, meadows, pastures, forest, heaths and rocks…”63 Eleventh 
century Normandy was not yet part of France, however;64 and although it is clear that 
William and his successors brought elements of continental feudal law to England,65 
any surviving evidence that he imported this particular French statute would require 
considerably more detailed historical digging. 
Moreover, the practice of William and his successors was inconsistent with 
the idea of the public trust. One purported violation of English liberty redressed in 
Magna Carta was the monarchical practice of granting exclusive franchises in 
navigable waters and fisheries to favored lesser nobility.66 The same was true for 
forests in which English people formerly enjoyed free access.67 The original 1215 
 
59. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 149-152. 
60. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 757–58 & n.83; Zucca, supra note 52, at 409; Benjamin 
Straumann, Early Modern Sovereignty and Its Limits, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423, 426–31 (2015). 
61. See supra notes 38–39, 58 and accompanying text. 
62. See RUSSELL, supra note 44; 1 WINSTON CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-
SPEAKING PEOPLES, VOL. I, THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN 126–27 (Bantam ed. 1963) (1956); Nicholas A. 
Robinson, The Charter of the Forest: Evolving Human Rights in Nature, in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE 
OF LAW (Daniel B. Magraw Jr., Andrea Martinez & Roy E. Brownell II eds., 2014) 311, 317–18. 
63. See Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 429 n.22. 
64. See SIR MAURICE POWICKE, THE LOSS OF NORMANDY, 1189-1204: STUDIES IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE ANGEVIN EMPIRE 8 (2d ed. 1960) (1913). 
65. See Ralph V. Turner, The Making of Magna Carta: The Historical Background, in MAGNA CARTA 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 17, 17-20 (Daniel B. Magraw Jr., Andrea Martinez, Roy E. Brownell II eds,. 
2014).  
66. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 3, 50–51 (1821). 
67. See Robinson, supra note 62, at 311–17. 
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Magna Carta68 sought to force King John to remove fish weirs that restricted public 
access to navigable rivers,69 and to remove enclosures adjacent to rivers and forests.70 
The Great Writ also prohibited the King from granting future exclusive grants.71 
Early American courts cited Magna Carta as authority for the nascent public trust 
doctrine on this continent.72 
Of course, the rights specified in Magna Carta are narrower and more 
specific than those covered by the modern public trust doctrine,73 even in the 
“traditional” form reflected in Illinois Central and similar cases.74 If the Charter was 
designed to prevent English monarchs from infringing on broader pre-existing rights, 
as some commentators suggest,75 the relevant provisions in Magna Carta provide 
some evidence of a pre-existing public trust tradition of common access to natural 
resources in Magna Carta was not fully democratic given that Runnymede was part 
of a conflict between King John and the English Barons, not between the nobility 
and the people.76 Nevertheless, although many provisions of Magna Carta addressed 
only the relative rights of knights and other nobles vis-a-vis the king, other liberties 
spelled out in the charter apply to “all free men of our kingdom,” and some of the 
rights are addressed to a “free man” or “any man” or anyone.77 At the time, the term 
“free men” referred to landowners other than nobility who held land “free” of feudal 
obligations, which included approximately half of England’s population.78 
 
68. After Pope Innocent III annulled the 1215 version (sealed by King John) shortly after it was 
negotiated at Runnymede, the Charter was reissued multiple times with various changes. For a summary, 
see Turner, supra note 65, at 42–44 (discussing citations of Magna Carta by Chief Justice Taft in Appleby 
v. New York, and by Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee). See also infra Section II.C. 
69. Magna Carta, § 33, available at https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-
translation# (British Museum trans. 2014). 
70. Id., at §§ 47, 52–53. 
71. See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 382 (1926); Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 
U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). 
72. See Wermiel, Magna Carta in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 111, 137 (Daniel B. Magraw Jr., Andrea Martinez & Roy E. Brownell II eds., 2014). 
73. See David Clark, Magna Carta Unchained: The Great Charter in Modern Commonwealth Law, in 
MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW 247, 266 (Daniel B. Magraw Jr., Andrea Martinez & Roy E. 
Brownell II eds., 2014).  
74. See infra Section II.C. 
75. See Clark, supra note 73, at 266. 
76. See Turner, supra note 65; Sandra Day O’Connor, Foreword, in MAGNA CARTA AND THE 
RULE OF LAW xi, xii–xiii (Daniel B. Magraw Jr., Andrea Martinez & Roy E. Brownell II eds., 2014); 
CHURCHILL, supra note 62, at xv–xi, 185–86. 
77. Magna Carta, supra note 69, §§ 27, 28, 30, 39, 40. See O’Connor, supra note 76, at xiii. 
78. See Turner, supra note 65, at 35. 
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The idea of an English public trust doctrine pre-dating the Norman 
conquest brings into question the origins of that doctrine. Rome ruled large portions 
of Britain for four centuries beginning in the middle of the first century A.D.,79 
bringing core principles of law that unified the Roman Empire.80 Although the 
Justinian Institutes were written over a century after Rome withdrew from Britain,81 
the Roman public trust doctrine can be traced to as early as the second century,82 
within the period of Roman rule. Documentation of the extent to which Roman law 
influenced early English common law is sparse, however, and English common law 
developed based on multiple legal traditions.83Alternatively, the public trust doctrine 
may have evolved independently in England,84 based on similar principles that 
 
79. The perception that Roman occupation began with Julius Caesar a century earlier is 
misleading. Julius Caesar mounted two armed incursions into Britain beginning in 55 B.C. to subdue 
troublesome tribes, but promptly left without leaving any significant aspects of Roman rule or civilization. 
See CHURCHILL, supra note 62, at 1–4, 10–12. The invasion that led to Roman colonization began a century 
later under Emperor Claudius, see id. at 13–14, and Roman rule continued until the end of the fourth 
century. See id. at 13–33. 
80. See id. at 21, 26–28, 31. 
81. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 121; CHURCHILL, supra note 62, at 31–41. 
82. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 163-165; Frier, supra note 19, at 642. 
83. Churchill described the evolution of English law as “a body of custom which, whatever its 
ultimate sources may be–folkright brought from beyond the seas by Danes, and by Saxons before them, 
maxims of civil jurisprudence culled from Roman codes–is being welded into one Common Law.” 
CHURCHILL, supra note 62, at x–xi; see also id. at 46–47 (describing the mingling of Saxon law with earlier 
Celtic law); 82, 88–89 (discussing influx of Danish customs and principles of justice into Anglo-Saxon 
society, and the efforts of King Alfred and Kind Edward “the Confessor” to assimilate these multiple 
sources of law and custom into a unified “common law” of England). Yet he also noted that English 
common law diverged significantly from the civil law codes influenced by Rome. See id. at 163–65. 
Professor Thomas Lund expressed uncertainty about the degree of influence Roman law had on English 
common law, see THOMAS LUND, THE CREATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE MEDIEVAL YEAR 
BOOKS DECIPHERED 1–3, 45 (2015), but noted its declining influence when the clerics abandoned judicial 
posts because of their reluctance to swear a preference for secular rather than ecclesiastical doctrine. Id. at 
23–34. See also id. at 350–51 (noting differences between codified law according to Roman methods and 
case law according to the English common law method). But see id. at 223 (documenting influence of 
Roman doctrine of res judicata).  
84. Some scholars hypothesize that Lord Matthew Hale’s late eighteenth century treatise on 
maritime law, LORD MATTHEW HALE, A TREATISE RELATIVE TO THE MARITIME LAW OF ENGLAND 
(1787), was the first real manifestation of the English public trust doctrine. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 
251 (arguing that the doctrine only took hold in England in late eighteenth century based on Hale’s 
treatise); MacGrady, supra note 25, at 7 (arguing that the prima facie rule of sovereign ownership was not 
adopted in England until 1795, by which time most of the English shoreline was in private ownership). 
Others trace the English common law roots to the seminal thirteenth century compilation of English 
common law by Henry de Bracton and collaborators. See Huffman, supra note 28, at 343; Lazarus, supra 
note 25, at 635. The reference is to Henry de Bracton’s On the Laws and Customs of England. See LUND, 
supra note 83, at 2. Yet the Bracton compilers did not write on a clean slate any more than did the authors 
of the Institutes of Justinian. This was simply the first effort to compile the case law produced by early 
English jurists into a set of general “common law” principles. See LUND, supra note 83, at 2-3. 
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certain lands and natural resources are shared and not amenable to private ownership. 
That possibility suggests that the concept was more universal than local, and thus a 
manifestation of natural law.   
Magna Carta’s companion, the “Charter of the Forest,”85 provides 
additional support for the idea that medieval English law and custom protected rights 
of common access to natural resources, including forests and their associated wildlife 
and aquatic resources.86 The Celtic tribes and others that inhabited Britain before the 
Romans arrived and after they left showed a strong history of individual liberty, 
without a highly structured central government, and a strong subsistence reliance on 
common resources.87 That dependence on forests for subsistence resources and the 
economy generally persisted into the thirteenth century,88 and rights to forest use 
were protected to some degree by pre-Norman monarchs.89 In creating Royal Forests, 
the Norman and Angevin kings displaced “the customary access of many, including 
commoners, to forest areas.”90 They also added large areas of forests previously 
subject to open access to the Royal Forests, thus closing them off to use by lesser 
nobles or commoners absent payments (or fines) to the king.91 Much as the modern 
public trust doctrine protects common access to essential shared resources and 
prohibits government alienation of those resources to private parties, the Forest 
Charter sought to restore common access to those forest resources, thus protecting 
the “liberties of the forest” pre-dating Norman rule.92  
Some argue that the lasting influence of Magna Carta and the Forest 
Charter on many aspects of Anglo-American law is a “myth” based more on re-
interpretations of the Charter in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by jurists 
such as Sir Edward Coke and William Blackstone.93 Moreover, from the modern lens 
 
85. Three provisions of the original 1215 Magna Carta addressed restoration of pre-existing rights 
of both nobles and commoners to use forests and forest resources. These provisions were deleted from the 
first reissued Magna Carta in 1217, but replaced with a separate, more detailed explication of forest rights 
and governance. See Robinson, supra note 62, at 313.  
86. According to Professor Robinson, the “forests” subject to the Forest Charter “consisted not 
merely of trees, but included meadows, grasslands, heaths, moors, streams, wetlands … along with 
longstanding commoners’ usufructs for pasturage or collecting wood.” Id. at 325. 
87. See CHURCHILL, supra note 62, at 7–10, 19 (noting “the primary right of men to die and kill 
for the land they lived in”), 22 (noting the rebellion of “a vast host of broken, hunted men resolved on 
death or freedom”), 24. 
88. See Robinson, supra note 62, at 316, 325. 
89. See id. at 317 (discussing forest governance under Edward the Confessor, who ruled from 1042–
1066). 
90. Id. at 317. 
91. See id. at 317–18. 
92. Id. at 314, 317–18. 
93. See Turner, supra note 65, at 44–46; Dillon, supra note 55, at 98–107. 
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of an industrial society, those aspects of Magna Carta and the Forest Charter 
pertaining to fish weirs and forest access may appear quaint and insignificant 
compared to the provisions now associated with lofty legal doctrines such as due 
process of law and habeas corpus.94 But those provisions bear a closer resemblance to 
their modern manifestations in the public trust doctrine than do other provisions of 
Magna Carta to their respective modern analogs.95  
The English public trust doctrine may reflect elements of Roman law 
during the Roman occupation; Continental law imported by the Normans; centuries 
of customary access to common resources in England under the Celtic, Saxon, and 
other traditions that comprised the melting pot of British law, custom, and culture; 
or a combination of them all. Regardless of the sources, English common law 
embraces a principle, consistent with natural law theory,96 that some portions of the 
earth are best made available for private ownership, while others are better left in 
common. 
3. Implications for American Public Trust Law 
Whether the American public trust doctrine derived from a single source 
or many, the details are not necessarily critical to analysis of the doctrine and its 
future.97 The basic idea is that some portions of the earth are amenable to private 
ownership, while other areas (the air, running water, the sea, and the seashore, as well 
as forest and other common resources) should remain as some form of public 
commons, or in some form of public ownership. As one U.S. court noted recently, 
“Justinian derived the doctrine from the principle that the public possesses inviolable 
rights to certain natural resources.”98 During the period in which American public 
trust law developed, American jurists routinely relied on multiple sources of 
authority to identify the “best” or “true” doctrines that should apply to a particular 
 
94. See O’Connor, supra note 76, at xii (referring to the fish weir provision as “mundane”); c.f. 
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 329–30 (First Vintage Books ed. 1997) (1996) (noting that the Federalists, in opposing 
the need for enumerated rights in the Constitution, “lampooned” a proposal to enumerate the right to 
hunt, fowl, and to fish on navigable waters and other public property). Of course, the fact that some 
delegates proposed such an amendment indicates that many Americans at the time viewed rights to natural 
resource access as important to their freedom and welfare. 
95. See Dillon, supra note 55, at 91–97 (comparing provisions of Magna Carta with provisions of 
the U.S. Constitution and concluding that “there is scant evidence of Magna Carta having a cornerstone 
or fountainhead impact on the U.S. Constitution as it emerged from the Constitutional Convention in 
1787”). 
96. See infra Section I.E.3. 
97. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 177. 
98. Lawrence v. Clark County, 254 P.3d 606, 608 (Nev. 2011). As discussed above, the doctrine 
was not “derived” by Emperor Justinian, see Davison, supra note 19, but the basic point about the principles 
the doctrine reflect remains valid.  
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issue.99 The following sections evaluate the extent to which U.S. public trust 
principles reflect common law, constitutional law, and natural law. 
C. The Public Trust Doctrine as Common Law 
Scholars continue to debate the legal sources and origins of the American 
public trust doctrine.100 The lion’s share of judicial authority, however, suggests that 
it derived most directly from English common law,101 and was inherited first by the 
British colonies and later by the states that succeeded them,102 or by later-admitted 
states under the Equal Footing Doctrine.103 The Nevada Supreme Court, for 
example, noted recently that, although the public trust doctrine was “thought to be” 
traceable to Roman law, it was clearly “adopted by the common law courts of England 
. . . .”104 Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that “its principles can be found 
in the English common law . . . .”105 
Rooting the public trust doctrine in English common law, however, does 
not resolve disagreements regarding the nature and breadth of that authority. Some 
scholars argue that, even if the public trust doctrine is a correct statement of English 
common law modified by American law,106 it simply confirms government title to a 
narrow category of lands beneath navigable waters.107 As such, the doctrine is not 
appropriately expanded to other resources and functions. Other scholars suggest that 
submerged land is simply one example of a broader principle, and that courts can 
 
99. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 770–73. 
100. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 25, at 803.  
101. See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 656 U.S. 576, 603–04 (2012) (although also noting roots 
in Roman civil law); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667–68 (1891); Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 
How.) 212, 228–29 (1845); Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 609; Ariz. Ctr. For L. in the Pub. Int. v. Hassell, 837 
P.2d 158, 161 (Ariz. 1991); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 718 (Cal. 1983) (although 
also noting roots in Roman civil law); Kootenai Env’t. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 
1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983) (on rehearing); Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 454–55 (N.J. 1850); Carson v. 
Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 477–78, 484 (Penn. 1810). 
102. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14–18 (1894); Illinois Ctrl. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 
456 (1892); Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 222–23; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 49–53 (1821). 
103. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 26–28; Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 222–23.  
104. Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 609; see also Hassell, 837 P.2d at 161 (doctrine “originates in a common-
law doctrine, dating back at least as far as Magna Charta ….”); Kootenai Env’t Alliance v. Panhandle 
Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Id. 1983) (describing doctrine as “one of the dominant principles 
of the English common law.”). 
105. PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 604. 
106. Not all scholars agree, with some arguing that American courts misinterpreted and misapplied 
the English doctrine. See James L. Huffman, Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine is Bad for the Public, 
45 ENV’T L. 337, 339–49 (2015). 
107. See Lazarus, supra note 25, at 691; Huffman, supra note 28, at 527, 541, 561. 
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modify the doctrine to suit new circumstances and to protect other common 
resources.108 
A related disagreement involves the degree to which the government holds 
title to lands underlying navigable waters, or other resources, subject to trust 
limitations. Some argue that the government holds those resources like other public 
property, and can dispose of them subject to applicable positive law.109 These scholars 
question whether principles of trust law even apply to public resources, despite the 
longstanding use of that terminology.110 At the other extreme is the idea that public 
trust resources, by their very nature, are unalienable.111 In the middle is a body of 
authority defining or limiting the reasons for which public trust resources can be 
privatized,112 by whom,113 to what extent,114 and with what qualifications.115 
 
108. See Babcock, supra note 30; Sax, supra note 26; Epstein, supra note 18. Cf. Robinson, supra note 
62, at 315, 344 (arguing that the principles adopted originally in the Charter of the Forest, arguably a 
precursor to the modern public trust doctrine, see supra Section II.B.2, have evolved to suit the changing 
needs and values of ensuing generations). 
109. See Huffman, supra note 106, at 368–69; Cohen, supra note 28, at 274–76. 
110. See Huffman, supra note 28, at 534–41; Lazarus, supra note 25, at 656–68.  
111. See Torres & Bellinger, supra note 18, at 284–87. 
112. See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 383–84 (1926) (authorizing grants for 
adequate compensation and pursuant to plan of harbor improvement in the public interest); Illinois Cent. 
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (allowing grants if “used in promoting the interests of the 
public” or “for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters”); In re Trempealeau Drainage 
Dist., 131 N.W. 838, 840–41 (Wisc. 1911) (authorizing draining of wetlands to improve navigation); Ward 
v. Mumford, 32 Cal. 365, 372–73 (Cal. 1867) (authorizing grants to improve navigation as consistent with 
the trust); Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80, 87 (Cal. 1854) (authorizing plan for filling lots in San Francisco 
Bay “to subserve the public good”); Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 458–59 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1850) (authorizing 
grants for public purposes), 466–68 (noting grants for dams, docks, and other improvements).  
113. See Appleby, 271 U.S. at 382 (authorizing legislative grants); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 
460 (by the legislature, with reservation of the power of future legislatures to change); Gough, 22 N.J.L. 
at 456–58 (authorizing valid grants by legislature acting as representatives of the people as sovereign).  
114. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48–50 (1894) (restricting federal grants of submerged lands 
held in trust for states to cases of “some international duty or public exigency”); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 
U.S. at 451–58 (limiting to discrete parcels but prohibiting for entire public harbor); Gough, 22 N.J.L. at 
459 (not permissible for “all the waters of the state”).  
115. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913) (qualifying 
private title to submerged lands as “subordinate to the public right of navigation” and “the absolute power 
of Congress over the improvement of navigable rivers”); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 457–58 (only 
with “an implied reservation of the public right”); Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 
(1842) (requiring that grants from the trust must be strictly construed); State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh 
R.R. Co., 94 Ohio St. 61, 69 (Ohio 1916) (any state title subject to federal government’s paramount rights 
of navigability); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 589 (Cal. 1913) (holding that owners took 
title subject to easement servitude for navigation and commerce); Taylor v. Underhill, 40 Cal. 471, 473 
(1871) (prohibiting sales that would materially interfere with navigation). 
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If these are purely issues of common law, they can be changed through the 
positive law of any jurisdiction. American courts have expressly modified English 
common law regarding the public trust doctrine when they found particular aspects 
of that law inapplicable or unsuited to the conditions in North America.116 Likewise, 
legislatures have the authority to modify or override even longstanding common law 
doctrines.117 
Yet although states have discretion regarding the scope and applicability of 
the public trust doctrine,118 no state has successfully119 eliminated it. Moreover, the 
U.S. Supreme Court and state courts suggest that such an effort would be 
impermissible.120 No court, however, has articulated a universal baseline for 
protection of public trust resources. Moreover, if such a baseline exists, it cannot be 
justified on common law grounds alone. Rather, it must be grounded either in a 
binding principle of constitutional law; or in a fundamental principle of law that is 
rooted so deeply in our legal tradition or our concept of natural rights and liberties 
that it is immutable. Those possibilities are explored in the following subsections. 
D. The Public Trust Doctrine as Constitutional Law 
The Supreme Court has held that certain aspects of the public trust doctrine 
are governed or influenced by the U.S. Constitution. It is important, however, to 
distinguish the specific public trust issues to which the Constitution applies from 
those aspects of the doctrine governed by common law. 
 
116. See, e.g., Shively, 152 U.S. at 11–26 (surveying ways in which English common law trust rule 
had been modified in U.S. states); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365–66 
(N.J. 1984) (expanding public trust protection to dry beaches recognizing modern uses and “the dynamic 
nature of the public trust doctrine”); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719–22 (Cal. 
1983) (recognizing earlier changes in geographic scope of navigable waters, and expanding protection to 
address water diversions from non-navigable tributaries to navigable waters); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 
374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (expanding trust purposes to include ecological, aesthetic, and scientific uses and 
values); Elder v. Burrus, 25 Tenn. 358, 365–67 (Tenn. 1845) (holding English rule on geographic scope 
of navigability not suited to conditions in Tennessee); Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. 30 (N.C. 1828) (holding 
English tidal rule inapplicable to circumstances in North Carolina); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307, 318 
(N.Y. 1826) (finding English rule regarding ebb and flow of tide unsuitable to Hudson River). 
117. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (indicating a presumption for retaining 
longstanding common law unless a statute overrides plainly and directly).   
118. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  
119. See supra note 40 (describing unsuccessful attempt by Arizona legislature to relinquish state 
public trust claims to majority of the state’s navigable waters).  
120. See, e.g., Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 393 (1926); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. 
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 451–55 (1892); California Fish Co., 166 Cal. at 591; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 
49–53 (N.J. 1821).  
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1. Allocation of Trust Authority 
In Martin v. Waddell121 and in Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan,122 the Supreme 
Court clarified that states, not the federal government, hold title to lands underlying 
navigable waters. Just as the British Crown as sovereign held title beneath navigable 
waters in trust for the British people, the Colonies held that trust on behalf of the 
settlers; and after the Revolution, the people of each state became sovereign and held 
that trust through their duly elected governments.123 Later-admitted states enjoy the 
same rights on an “equal footing” with the original states.124 
In cases delineating the federal navigational servitude,125 however, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Commerce Clause of the Constitution126 as a cession 
by the states of that portion of sovereignty necessary to empower the federal 
government to protect navigable waters for interstate and international commerce.127 
To the extent that the public trust doctrine protects the common use and preservation 
of navigable waters for public uses such as navigation, fishing, and commerce, the 
federal navigation servitude divides that trust authority and responsibility between 
the state and federal governments.128 When the Supreme Court has addressed 
 
121. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
122. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
123. See Martin, 41 U.S. at 409–16.  
124. Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 221–22. The “equal footing” doctrine with respect to state ownership 
and control of navigable waters was one application of a general principle, adopted by Congress in early 
state Acts of Admission, that new states should be admitted with the “same rights of freedom, sovereignty, 
and independence” as existing states. See id. at 221. Although the “equal footing” language appears 
nowhere in no constitutional text, it implements the State Admission Clause. U.S. CONST., art. IV, §3, 
cl. 1. 
125. See generally Robert W. Adler, The Ancient Mariner of Constitutional Law: The Historical, Yet 
Declining Role of Navigability, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1643, 1676–82 (2013) (surveying cases). 
126. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 3.  
127. See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 656 U.S. 576, 591 (2012) (states gained title to lands 
beneath navigable waters “subject only to the ‘paramount power of the United States to control such waters 
for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce.’”); see also United States v. Grand River 
Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960); United States v. Twin Cities Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956); 
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62–63 (1913). This doctrine had 
antecedents in Supreme Court jurisprudence establishing plenary federal Commerce Clause authority 
over navigable waters. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); South 
Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876); Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865); 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
128. See Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. at 63 (“Congress possesses all the powers [over navigable 
waters] which existed in the states before adoption of the national Constitution, and which have always 
existed in the Parliament in England.”).  
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conditions under which states may alienate trust property, it has underscored that 
any such dispositions remain subject to the federal navigation servitude.129  
Navigable waters are not the only area in which the states ceded some of 
their control over public trust resources to the federal government pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause and other constitutional authority. For example, states retain 
police power authority to manage and protect wildlife within their territory even 
though the Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of state “ownership” of wildlife.130 
With respect to some kinds of wildlife, including interstate and international 
migratory birds131 and threatened and endangered species,132 however, the states 
ceded to the federal government some level of trust responsibility and authority as 
well. Arguably, the same is true for protection of atmospheric resources. Although 
states have authority and responsibility as parens patriae to protect common resources 
from air pollution,133 the Clean Air Act134 reflects the federal government’s authority 
to redress interstate pollution and pollution that otherwise affects interstate 
commerce.135 
In addition, where the federal government held lands in territorial status 
prior to the creation of new states, despite its “plenary authority” over public lands136 
under the Property Clause,137 it held lands underlying navigable waters in trust for 
 
129. See Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. at 60–62 (holding that, when state law confers technical 
title to beds of navigable waters to adjacent landowners, title remains subject to the federal servitude); 
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14–18 (1894) (holding that title to discrete parcels states grant to private 
parties remains subject to those rights the states surrendered to federal government). Accord Illinois Central, 
146 U.S. at 465 (Shiras, J., dissenting). 
130. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329–36 (1979) (rejecting state effort to restrict interstate 
trade in wildlife as Commerce Clause violation but confirming the state’s police power authority over 
wildlife). Earlier, the Supreme Court had upheld state efforts to restrict interstate wildlife exports as 
sovereigns who hold wildlife in trust for their people. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529–30 (1896).  
131. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430–35 (1920) (upholding Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
pursuant to federal power to enter into and enforce treaties with foreign nations). 
132. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1134 (upholding 
applicability of Endangered Species Act to intrastate population of red wolves based on tourism and other 
interstate impacts).  
133. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (affirming state power to 
redress interstate air pollution to protect the shared resources of its citizenry, including air, forests, and 
agricultural resources). 
134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-515.  
135. See Connecticut v. E.P.A., 696 F.2d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 1982). 
136. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539–40 (1976); Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 
750. 
137. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl.2. 
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future states.138 This preserved the rights of future states to be admitted on an equal 
footing with the original states and all other previously admitted states. Thus, under 
multiple provisions of the Constitution, the federal government held pre-statehood 
sovereign lands subject to two distinct, but related, trusts. First, it held those lands 
in trust for the future states themselves. Consistent with that trust, any alleged 
conveyances of sovereign lands to other parties were subject to strict judicial scrutiny 
and a presumption against such conveyances absent clear indications to the 
contrary.139 Second, until those states were admitted, the federal government that 
held those lands as sovereign, bound itself by the traditional public trust doctrine.140 
2. Substance of the Public Trust Doctrine 
None of the above principles of constitutional law dictate or authorize the 
federal government to dictate, legislatively or judicially, the substance of the public 
trust doctrine. There are three ways, however, in which federal constitutional 
provisions potentially implicate the substance of the public trust doctrine.  
First, although the Commerce Clause is the constitutional vehicle through 
which the states conceded part of their public trust authority and responsibility to 
the federal government,141 it also grants substantive authority to Congress.142 
Nothing in the text of the Commerce Clause, however, expressly invokes the public 
trust doctrine, much less instructs Congress about how to exercise such authority. 
This is logical given that the cession of public trust authority is simply one of many 
areas in which the states, in adopting the broadly phrased Commerce Clause, ceded 
authority over interstate and international commerce. The Commerce Clause 
provides no additional substantive guidance regarding the many other spheres in 
which it authorizes Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. At a 
minimum, however, it confers federal public trust authority only regarding  issues 
that fall within the reach of Commerce Clause power. 
Second, by making state alienation of public trust resources subject to 
residual federal authority under the Commerce Clause and the federal navigational 
servitude, the U.S. Constitution provides one way to impose a floor on the public 
trust doctrine. The Commerce Clause and the federal navigational servitude ensure 
that public trust protection of common public resources—at least those affecting 
 
138. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 28–31 (1894); Knight v. U.S. Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 
183–84 (1891); Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222–23 (1845).  
139. See Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272–73 (2001).  
140. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 48–50.  
141. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
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interstate and foreign commerce—depends on application of public trust principles 
by both the states and the federal government. 
The Property Clause of the Constitution also potentially influences the 
federal government’s administration or supervision of sovereign public trust 
resources.143 For two seemingly opposite but ultimately consistent reasons, however, 
the Property Clause lacks any substantive standards governing the use and 
management of public trust resources. With respect to public lands, the Property 
Clause grants Congress “plenary authority,” unfettered discretion to determine how 
that property best serves the public interest, including the grant or sale of those lands 
to others.144 If public trust resources are viewed as a part of the nation’s property like 
any other, Congress would have discretion to alienate that property. Congress could 
abandon public trust resources, a result the Supreme Court did not sanction with 
respect to state public trust resources in Illinois Central and other cases.145 The 
Property Clause as interpreted generally, therefore, appears to provide no 
substantive constraints on the federal government’s disposition of trust resources. 
Just as states hold sovereign lands in a different capacity from other public 
property, however, the federal government exercises Commerce Clause and 
navigational servitude authority in a manner distinct from its management of public 
lands generally. With respect to pre-statehood sovereign lands, the Equal Footing 
doctrine obligated the federal government to manage public trust resources in the 
same capacity as any future state, and to preserve them in trust for future states.146 
With respect to sovereign lands held by states, the Commerce Clause and the federal 
navigational servitude confer residual authority to protect and manage those 
resources for the traditional public trust uses of commerce and navigation.147 Neither 
the Equal Footing Clause nor the Commerce Clause, however, delineate substantive 
principles regarding the exercise of the trust. 
One must look elsewhere to find substantive rules or constraints on state 
and federal use, protection, and disposition of public trust resources. The third 
potential constitutional vehicle for doing so is the Ninth Amendment.148 Debate 
continues regarding the extent to which the Ninth Amendment is an independent 
 
143. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; 
and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice and Claims of the United States, or 
of any particular State.”). 
144. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 n.136 (1976); Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, 
at 750. 
145. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
147. See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text. 
148. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
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source of unenumerated rights, and if so, the appropriate source of those rights.149 I 
assumed a positive answer to that question in analyzing natural law support for prior 
appropriation, and do so here as well. If the legal rules governing the public trust 
doctrine are simply a matter of state and federal common law, they can be changed 
via common law process or by statute. Unless the government’s duty as sovereign to 
maintain and protect those resources protects fundamental rights rooted so deeply in 
our legal tradition that they are viewed as inalienable, and thus “retained by the 
people.” That possibility is explored next. 
E. The Public Trust Doctrine as Natural Law 
Courts have used language sounding in natural law to support the public 
trust doctrine, either expressly or by implication. That was true most often at times 
when natural law was more prominent in U.S. jurisprudence,150 but recent judicial 
decisions have also invoked natural law to support public trust principles.151 
Other legal scholars have addressed the relevance of natural law to the 
public trust doctrine, although from different perspectives than I present below. In 
an early treatment of the issue based on libertarian theory, Richard Epstein adopts a 
consequentialist view152 in which he asks what set of rules best promote and correct 
voluntary transactions, and what role government should play in protecting common 
property from government intrusion.153 He ultimately adopts the view that any 
property held in common in the “original position” that pre-dated civil society 
warrants public trust protection.154 George Smith and Michael Sweeney reach a 
nearly opposite conclusion, arguing for a much more restrictive application of the 
public trust doctrine,155 based on a significantly theistic view of natural law.156 Gerald 
Torres and Nathan Bellinger argue that the public trust reflects pre-existing or 
inherent rights that are “merely secured by government” and hence are “the 
chalkboard on which the Constitution is written.”157 
 
149. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 777–78. 
150. See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 49–50 (N.J. 1821); see also Prior Appropriation, supra note 
1, at 771–74 (identifying when natural law was most predominant in U.S. jurisprudence). 
151. See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 947–48 (Pa. 2013).  
152. Epstein, supra note 18, at 412 n.1 (“what general set of legal institutions will advance the 
welfare of the public at large”). 
153. Id. at 413–14. 
154. Id. at 428. 
155. See Smith & Sweeney, supra note 18. 
156. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
157. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 18, at 288. 
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As argued in Prior Appropriation, in a society governed by positive law, 
natural law alone cannot support a significant legal doctrine, particularly where duly 
enacted positive law provides otherwise.158 To that extent, I agree with Professor 
Huffman that unbounded reliance on vague principles of natural law to disrupt 
settled legal expectations is inconsistent with democracy.159 Individuals and 
governments are bound to obey positive law even if it conflicts with their views about 
what is just, under principles of natural law or otherwise. That is particularly true in 
the United States with respect to theistic sources of natural law, given constitutional 
separation of church and state,160 and absent a parallel in secular law.161 Despite that 
limitation, as discussed below, natural law reasoning remains relevant to the history 
and evolution of the public trust doctrine, particularly when properly bounded by 
checks and balances and other institutional constraints. 
1. Natural Law in American Public Trust Jurisprudence 
Natural law principles can inform or support a legal doctrine adopted via 
positive law. They can guide judicial analysis of common law issues of first 
impression.162 They can influence judicial exercise of equitable doctrines by shedding 
light on what is just from an historical perspective.163 They can serve as a benchmark 
to determine whether a statute offends fundamental rights protected by the Ninth 
Amendment, although the debate continues about the standards that apply to Ninth 
Amendment analysis, and the appropriate sources of those standards.164 
Early American courts cited natural law to bolster analysis of the English 
public trust doctrine. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick relied heavily on natural law in Arnold 
v. Mundy,165 arguably the most influential early state court public trust decision.166 In 
 
158. Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 779. 
159. See Huffman, supra note 28. 
160. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
161. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 779–80. For example, the Biblical Commandment that 
there is only one God is purely religious, whereas the prohibition against murder is a universally 
recognized principle of law. See id. at 755 n.66 and accompanying text.  
162. See id. at 771-72.  
163. See id. at 772–73. 
164. See id. at 777–78. 
165. 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821). 
166. Courts often cite Illinois Central as the seminal or “lodestar” case in U.S. public trust 
jurisprudence, see, e.g., Kootenai Env’t Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088-89 
(Idaho 1983); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983), although one U.S. 
Supreme Court decision confers that honor on Shively v. Bowlby. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 
484 U.S. 469, 473 (1988). Arnold v. Mundy predated all of the relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases, 
however, and the Supreme Court relied on Chief Justice Kirkpatrick’s reasoning as early as Martin v. 
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analyzing the grant from King Charles II to the Duke of York establishing the East 
Jersey settlement, Justice Kirkpatrick wrote:  
 
If we shall find some things contained in it, which by the laws of 
England, as well as of all other civilized countries, and even by the 
very law of nature itself, are declared to be the common property of 
all men, then, by every fair rule of construction, we are to consider 
these things as granted to him, as the representative of the 
sovereign, and as a trustee to support the title for the common use 
….167 
 
Moreover, Justice Kirkpatrick relied heavily on natural law in articulating 
what may be the most frequently quoted portion of his holding, and elsewhere in his 
opinion: 
 
The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with 
the principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well-
ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of 
the state, divesting all citizens of their common right. It would be 
a grievance which could never be long borne by a free people.168 
 
Consistent with the practice at the time of citing natural law as part of a 
multi-faceted analysis,169 Chief Justice Kirkpatrick relied on natural law, along with 
the civil and common laws, to justify his holding.170  
 
Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 433–44 (1842), and in both Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 
456 (1892), and in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14–18 (1894). 
167. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 70 (N.J. 1821) (emphasis added). 
168. Id. at 78 (emphasis added). See also id. at 71 (“Of [the kind of property common to all citizens] 
according to the writers upon the law of nature and of nations, and upon the civil law, are the air, the 
running water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts.”); id. at 72 (property “destined for the common use 
and immediate enjoyment of every individual citizen, according to his necessity, being the immediate gift 
of nature to all men, and, therefore, called the common property”) (italics in original). 
169. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 772. 
170. See 6 N.J.L. at 75–76 (“On the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, that by the law of nature, 
which is the only true foundation of all the social rights; that by the civil law, which formerly governed 
almost all the civilized world, and which is still the foundation of the polity of almost every nation in 
Europe, that by the common law of England ….[n]avigable waters are common to all citizens.”). 
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Other early state courts relied on natural law to explain the public trust 
doctrine,171 although not universally.172 Some state courts rooted public trust 
principles in natural rights that formed a key part of Enlightenment political theory, 
without using the term “natural law.”173 Even in modifying the result in Arnold v. 
Mundy by clarifying that the state legislature had power to dispose of discrete trust 
resources where consistent with the purposes of the trust, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court continued to rely on natural law principles.174 
The U.S. Supreme Court also relied on natural law in its early public trust 
jurisprudence. Although Justice Thompson dissented from the result in Martin v. 
Waddell’s Lessee, he agreed with the basic natural law principle supporting the state 
public trust doctrine, paraphrasing Chief Justice Kirkpatrick: 
 
The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot consistently with the 
principles of the laws of nature, and the constitution of a well-
ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of 
the state, divesting all the citizens of a common right. It would be 
a grievance which could never be long borne by free men.175  
 
Likewise, in Illinois Central, Justice Field quoted with approval those 
portions of Arnold v. Mundy citing “the law of nature and the constitution of a well-
ordered society.”176 Other references to natural law in the Supreme Court’s 
nineteenth century public trust jurisdiction are more subtle, but still grounded in 
natural law reasoning.177 
 
171. See, e.g., Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (referring to principles 
ex jure naturae [from natural law] as governing rights to divert streams).  
172. See Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 483–87 (Penn. 1810) (extending state ownership to beds of 
waters navigable in fact rather than those influenced by the ebb and flow of the tides, modifying English 
common law to suit geography of Pennsylvania); Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80, 87 (1854) (rooting early 
California public trust law in “the law of nations, and the common and civil law”).  
173. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 67–68, 70 (Mass. 1851) (rooting public rights 
to navigable waters in Massachusetts in traditional English liberties as used in Magna Carta, the 
Declaration of Rights, and similar principles of English law).  
174. See Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 456–57 (N.J. 1850) (acknowledging that legislature is not 
omnipotent in exercising trust discretion because constrained by constitutional provisions and because its 
“powers are abridged by fundamental laws”); see also id. at 459 (quoting with approval statement in Arnold 
rejecting state’s ability to make absolute grants to all state waters “consistently with the laws of nature”). 
175. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 420 (1842) (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
176. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892). 
177. See, e.g., The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 458 (1851) (applying 
congressional determination of navigability more generally because those distinctions “are founded in 
truth and reason”). 
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The Supreme Court most expressly relied on natural law to support its 
holding that sovereigns have a trust responsibility to manage common wildlife 
resources for the benefit of the public at large.178 Tracing the origins of the common 
ownership doctrine to Roman law, in which wild animals are designated as “ferae 
naturae, which, having no owner, were considered as belonging in common to all the 
citizens of the state,”179 Justice White wrote: 
 
There are things which we acquire the dominion of, as by the law 
of nature, which the light of natural reason causes every man to see, and 
others we acquire by the civil law; that is to say, by methods 
belonging to the government. As the law of nature is more ancient, 
because it took birth with the human race it is proper to speak first 
of the latter. (1) Thus, all the animals which can be taken upon the 
earth, in the sea, or in the air,– that is to say, wild animals, – 
belong to those who take them … because that which belongs to 
nobody is acquired by the natural law by the person who first 
possesses it.180 
 
Justice White explained why state regulation of wildlife was consistent with 
this natural law theory,181 and how those principles were adopted as positive law both 
in European civil codes182 and in English common law.183 He concluded:  
 
While the fundamental principles upon which the common 
property in game rest have undergone no change, the 
development of free institutions had led to the recognition of the 
fact that the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from 
this common ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers 
of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, or for the 




178. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896). 
179. Id. at 522. 
180. Id. at 523 (emphasis added). 
181. Id. at 524. 
182. Id. at 526 (citing articles 714 and 715 of the Napoleonic Code). 
183. Id. at 526–27 (quoting Blackstone’s analysis of the natural law basis for a public trust in 
common resources such as light, air, water, and animals). 
184. Id. at 529. 
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In his dissent in Geer, Justice Field rooted his decision in natural law 
regarding ownership of resources that are not the property of anyone “until they are 
brought into subjection or use by the labor or skill of man,” and “[t]hat which belongs 
to nobody is acquired by the natural law by the first person who possesses it.”185 
Justice Field’s dissent was not based on any disagreement with the fundamental 
principle that wildlife is a common resource held in trust by the government as 
sovereign until individual animals are reduced to private ownership. Rather, he 
would have rejected as a Commerce Clause violation the position that a state could 
exercise the trust to the exclusion other states.186 To support that constitutional 
position, he continued to rely on natural law, arguing that exclusionary state 
regulation “would convert [wildlife] from the freedom of use which belongs to 
property in general to the limited use of the persons or communities where found 
….”187 In other words, exclusive state trust ownership did more to restrict than to 
promote the common liberty supported by natural law.  
When the Supreme Court overruled the state “ownership” doctrine of Geer 
based on the same objections raised by Justice Field in his dissent,188 it did nothing 
to reject the principle that wildlife is a shared resource that is incapable of 
“ownership,” either by an individual or by the state. Rather, it referred to state 
ownership as a legal fiction to justify the state’s legitimate interest in regulating and 
protecting wildlife for common benefit. As a matter of federalism, the constitutional 
treatment of wildlife under Hughes is no different than the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of navigable waters discussed earlier.189 States have responsibility to 
manage and protect wildlife as a shared resource for the benefit of their citizens, just 
as states have responsibility to do so with respect to navigable waters. But in ratifying 
the Constitution, states ceded that portion of their sovereignty regarding wildlife as 
necessary to empower the federal government to regulate and protect wildlife in 
interstate and foreign commerce.  
The key difference between wildlife and navigable waters is in the positive 
law implementation of the natural law principle. With respect to the beds of 
navigable waters, it makes sense to provide that the state as sovereign holds jus 
publicum title on behalf of the public at large, subject to the federal government’s 
superior authority to regulate navigability for Commerce Clause purposes. 
 
185. Id. at 539 (Field, J., dissenting). 
186. Id. at 538, 541. 
187. Id. at 542. 
188. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329–36 (1979) (citing Justice Field’s dissent in Geer, 161 
U.S. at 535). 
189. See supra Section I.D.1. 
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“Ownership” makes little sense with respect to a non-stationary resource such as 
wildlife,190 but public trust authority and responsibility remains. 
Consistent with the decline in the use of natural law by American judges 
beginning in the twentieth century and its replacement by legal positivism as the 
primary mode of legal analysis,191 modern public trust cases have largely abandoned 
their overt natural law trappings, except in two respects. First, modern cases continue 
to cite Roman law as foundational,192 and that law refers to “the law of nature.”193 
Second, in describing the public trust as an “ancient doctrine of common law,” courts 
implicitly recognize that early common law was influenced strongly by natural law.194  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently adopted natural law reasoning 
in construing the state’s constitutional environmental rights provision. In Robinson 
Township v. Commonwealth, the Court described the Declaration of Rights in Article 
I of Pennsylvania’s Constitution as “the terms of the social contract between 
government and the people that are of such ‘general, great and essential’ quality as 
to be ensconced as ‘inviolate.’”195 It then described those as “inherent in man’s nature 
and preserved rather than created by the Pennsylvania Constitution.”196 Despite the 
fact that the Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Amendment197 was adopted long 
after the initial adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution,198 the Court deemed it as 
“[a]mong the inherent rights of the people.”199  
By now, American public trust jurisprudence has developed a firm footing 
in the nation’s positive law, both through the common law200 and to some extent 
 
190. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (“To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean 
upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of 
ownership.”). 
191. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 774–76. 
192. See Huffman, supra note 28 (tracing the history of the public trust doctrine from Roman times 
to today).  
193. See id. at 7. 
194. See e.g., Ariz. Ctr. For L. in the Pub. Int. v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 166 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
195. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 947 (Pa. 2013). 
196. Id. at 948. 
197. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
198. For a detailed history and interpretation of amendment, see generally John C. Dernbach, Taking 
the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part I–An Interpretive Framework for 
Article I, Section 27, 103 DICKINSON L. REV. 693 (1999). 
199. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948. Perhaps not coincidentally, it was Pennsylvania delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention who proposed an amendment to guarantee common access rights of 
hunting on public lands and fishing in navigable waters. See Rakove, supra note 94, at 329–30. 
200. See supra Section I.C. 
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through the Commerce Clause and other provisions of the U.S. Constitution.201 It 
also has roots in natural law reasoning. Analysis of those natural law roots remains 
important in deciding two important legal issues: first, whether states have the 
authority to eliminate the doctrine or to curtail it; and second, the extent to which 
the doctrine is limited to the beds of navigable waters, or whether it is legitimate to 
expand the doctrine to protect other resources, including the atmosphere. Natural 
law provides support or explanatory context for both the Roman public trust doctrine 
and the public trust doctrine as it developed in English common law, and as reflected 
in Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forest. 
2. Greco-Roman Natural Law and the Roman Public Trust Doctrine 
Some Roman Law scholars link the Roman public trust doctrine to natural 
law. It is not clear, however, how much the Roman public trust derived from concepts 
of natural law as opposed to a pragmatic balancing of public and private rights in 
certain resources.  
The Institutes of Justinian expressly use the words “by the law of nature.” In 
addition, Frier notes that the Institutes describe natural law as prior to the civil law of 
individual states, and that the notion of res communes “antedate[s] the emergence of 
civil government, which through law gradually establishes and protects other types 
of property, but … leaves certain things (the air, the sea, the seashore, larger rivers) 
in their original, pre-legal condition.”202 This is similar to later Enlightenment 
theories about the evolution of property from pre-state to state status.203  
Early Greek philosophers debated the value of public versus common 
property in a well-ordered society, often arguing against extensive private property 
in favor of a sharing of common resources.204 The Romans ultimately adopted a 
system of private property,205 but that does not presumptively conflict with the 
Roman public trust doctrine any more than our system of private property conflicts 
with the American public trust doctrine. Both assume that some resources are more 
valuable if held in common. Roman law imposed constraints on the sovereignty of 
an otherwise absolute ruler,206 which logically included restraints on the ability of the 
 
201. See supra Section I.D. 
202. Frier, supra note 19, at 642–43. See also Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 155-156 (linking the 
Roman public trust doctrine to “a very early period in human experience, the Golden Age, when no 
property was held in private, but all in common”). 
203. See infra Section I.E.3. 
204. See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 111, 231 (Cynics), 252 (Stoics). But see id. at 243, 246 
(demonstrating contrary view of Epicureans). 
205. See WILLIAM WARWICK BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 182 (2d ed. 1932) 
(explaining that wealth or private property could be held in several forms). 
206. See Straumann, supra note 60, at 434. 
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sovereign (whether in the form of an Emperor or other authority) to alienate 
common resources.  
Although there were antecedents,207 natural law during the Roman Empire 
manifested most prominently in Stoic philosophy.208 Stoicism focuses on individual 
behavior and virtue rather than on property and the relationship between the 
individual and the state.209 According to at least one historian of philosophy, 
however, the Stoics influenced the evolution of natural law and natural rights during 
the Enlightenment: 
 
The doctrine of natural right, as it appears in the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, is a revival of a Stoic 
doctrine, though with important modifications. It was the Stoics 
who distinguished jus naturale from jus gentium. Natural law was 
derived from first principles of the kind held to underlie all 
general knowledge. By nature, the Stoics held, all human beings 
are equal. Marcus Aurelius, in his Meditations, favours ‘a polity 
in which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with 
regard to equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and a kingly 
 
207. See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 11 (noting the influence of the concept of fate on Greek thought, 
suggesting it as a source of natural law), 27 (discussing early Greek concept of justice as dictated by a 
natural law that sets eternal boundaries), 114 (explaining the influence of fate or necessity on the concept 
of justice in Plato’s Republic). See also Hadley Arkes, A Natural Law Manifesto or an Appeal from the Old 
Jurisprudence to the New, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1245, 1248 (2012) (quoting Aristotle’s view that “law 
sprang from the nature of only one kind of creature”); Daniel R. Heimbach, Natural Law in the Public 
Square, 2 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 685, 689–91 (2008) (discussing natural law theories of Protagoras, Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero); Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Theory and Practice 
of Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2269 (2001) (tracing natural law theory to Aristotle); Kirk 
A. Kennedy, Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 33, 
41–44 (1997) (tracing natural law theory from Greek philosophers through the Catholic tradition); Note, 
Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, 9 STAN. L. REV. 455, 459 (1957) (noting natural law roots from Greece 
and Rome, including the Justinian Institutes). 
208. See infra Section I.E.2. 
209. See RUSSELL, supra note 44 (distinguishing between Stoic rejection of materialism in favor of 
virtue and democratic idea that equality and justice must also include power and property). Any reference 
to “Greek philosophy,” of course, must reflect that it was, itself, extremely diverse. For example, although 
Plato pre-dated the stoics by several centuries, his Utopia advocated an authoritarian system and envisioned 
only limited private property. See id. at 108, 113–15, 119. The cynics rejected the idea of private property 
altogether. See id. at 231. Aristotle took an intermediate view: “Property should be private, but people 
should be so trained in benevolence as to allow the use of it to be largely common. Benevolence and 
generosity are virtues, and without private property they are impossible.” Id. at 188–89. For a 
contemporary example of the degree to which Stoicism focuses on the individual, see generally RYAN 
HOLLIDAY & STEPHEN HANSELMAN, THE DAILY STOIC, 366 MEDITATIONS ON WISDOM, 
PERSEVERANCE, AND THE ART OF LIVING (2016). 
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government which respects most of all the freedom of the 
governed.210 
 
In the face of centuries of Greco-Roman history in which privileges were 
reserved for an elite class of nobles or wealthy citizens and merchants, Stoic natural 
law established the idea of natural rights and human equality. To the extent that the 
public trust doctrine supports equal access by all members of a society to common 
resources as a matter of fundamental rights (as opposed to economic efficiency), as 
explained in the following section, this was a critical evolution. 
3. Enlightenment Natural Law and the English Public Trust Doctrine 
Natural law in the Enlightenment supports the English public trust more 
clearly than is true with respect to Stoic natural law and the Roman public trust 
because the relationship between individuals and their governments is better 
reflected in Lockean notions of private versus public property.211 This is important 
because American courts inherited public trust law from English common law, and 
to some extent from its manifestation in Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forest, 
irrespective of whether Roman civil law influenced English public trust law.212  
Natural law in the Enlightenment is not based primarily on theistic 
sources.213 It relies on reason to deduce the optimal relationship between individuals 
and the state.214 The theory begins with hypothetical pre-political societies,215 which 
 
210. RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 270. Russell believed that the “self-evident” truths in the 
Declaration of Independence reflected the application to political rights of the idea of self-evident maxims 
in mathematics from Greek geometry. Id. at 36. See also, Straumann, supra note 60, at 425–31.  
211. See, e.g., Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 781, 800; Epstein, supra note 15, at 2346; Eric T. 
Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOL. L.Q.  631, 636–37 (1996); Morton J. Horowitz, 
The History of Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (1982). But see Terry W. Frazier, 
Protecting Ecological Integrity Within the Balancing Function of Property Law, 28 ENV’T L. 53, 60 (1998) 
(arguing that “Neo-Lockeans” have lulled environmentalists into use of Lockean ideas).  
212. See supra Section I.C. 
213. It would have been perilous for Reformation and Enlightenment writers to disassociate 
themselves entirely from religion. See generally Peter Laslett, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (detailing the 
political and religious constraints Locke faced in writing the Two Treatises and other works). Often, they 
cited and analyzed religious text to refute theories such as the divine right of kings supported by others, 
as was true, for example, for Locke’s entire first treatise. See generally LOCKE, supra note 213, bk. I 
(containing detailed refutation, based Biblical text, of Sir Robert Filmer’s defense of the divine right of 
kings).  
214. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 757–60; LOCKE, supra note 213, bk. II, ch. 2, § 12 
(asserting that there is a law of nature based on reason); ch. 6, § 57 (asserting that freedom depends on 
the law of reason). 
215. It is not clear whether any of the liberal theorists of the Enlightenment believed literally that 
early societies acted in the ways they described, as opposed to using hypotheticals to describe and explain 
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Locke and others called “the state of nature,”216 and then speculates about the 
agreements, or “social contracts,” reached by individuals and their rulers in 
establishing governments.217 Individuals in the state of nature enjoyed “perfect 
freedom,” or liberty, and “perfect equality,” because no government existed to restrict 
freedom to take whatever action was consistent with the well-being of individuals or 
their family or other group.218 This included unlimited access to the “commons” for 
purposes of hunting, fishing, gathering, and other activities necessary for 
subsistence.219 In this sense, perfect liberty for all was perfectly egalitarian, but 
inconsistent with private property because that would limit the ability of anyone but 
a property owner to engage in hunting, fishing, foraging, and other subsistence 
activities without trespassing.  
Under this construct, perfect freedom works until there is conflict between 
two or more individuals, competing for the same resource or otherwise. Natural law 
theorists postulated that pre-society individuals were bound by a “Law of Nature … 
which obliges every one,” and instructing that “being all equal and independent, no 
one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”220 To prevent 
or redress violations of this fundamental rule, individuals could resort to self-help, 
grounded in the natural right to self-defense and self-preservation and the obligation 
 
their views of more perfect governments. See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 550 (describing Hobbes’s 
Leviathan as presenting “an explanatory myth” to explain why people accept government with its limits 
on freedom). Recent science suggests that humans began to band into primitive societies extremely early 
in history, see YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS 22–28 (2015), but also note that early human societies 
varied dramatically in their social order and forms of governance. See id. at 42–45. 
216. See LOCKE, supra note 213, bk. II, ch. 2; see also RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 550 (describing 
Hobbes’ description of the “state of nature”). 
217. See LOCKE, supra note 213, bk. II, ch. 8 (describing the beginning of political societies). See 
also RUSSELL, supra note 44 at 550 (describing Hobbes’s description of the “social contract”). Hobbes 
differed from Locke and later Rousseau in arguing that the social contract was between individuals 
agreeing to cede all power to a ruler, thus supporting his views of absolute monarchy. Locke and Rousseau, 
by contrast, believed the contract was between individuals and their government, thus preserving rights 
for individuals and preserving the rights of citizens to rebel against their government for violation of the 
contract. See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 551. The degree to which any such “agreements” came in the form 
of overt discussion and understanding, as opposed to tacit acknowledgment or acceptance, is obviously a 
matter of sheer speculation and likely varied widely across cultures and societies. More formal and clearly 
conscious written agreements, in the form of written constitutions or other governance agreements, came 
much later in history. See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 947–48 
(Pa. 2013) (explaining that Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution reflected a “social contract” between 
the people and the Commonwealth regarding fundamental rights that had been reserved).  
218. See LOCKE, supra note 213, bk. II, ch. 2, § 4; See also RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 550. 
219. See Freyfogle, supra note 211, at 633; CHURCHILL, supra note 62, at 7 (describing use of 
common forests and other resources for hunting and fishing in early Britain); RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 
634 (noting that the poor status of rural laborers in Locke’s time was mitigated by the commons, to which 
people had important rights); Robinson, supra note 62. 
220. LOCKE, supra note 213, bk. II, ch. 2, § 6. 
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to “preserve the rest of Mankind.”221 Locke and others recognized, however, that a 
society in which individuals judge their own cause is inherently problematic.222 Thus, 
it made sense to forego the perfect liberty reflected in self-help in return for a system 
of impartial justice.  
Beginning with a theistic perspective, Locke suggested that God gave the 
Earth to humanity in common, along with all of the fruits of nature.223 He then 
reasoned, however, that people must be able to appropriate resources to subsist,224 
and that individuals or groups were not likely to invest their labor and capital in 
farming or other endeavors involving individual parcels of land or other resources 
absent security of ownership.225 That led to Locke’s famous maxim that private 
property is justified when an individual, through labor or other investment, adds 
value to a previously common resource.226 Why would one invest time and labor to 
plant crops, dig for minerals, or engage in other economically useful activities if one 
could not reap profits from the resulting increase in value? 
In accepting private property and its suggested benefits, however, 
individuals ceded their “perfect freedom” on land reduced to individual ownership.227 
But societies needed to decide which resources remained so fundamental to the 
common welfare that more collective liberty and welfare would be lost by allowing 
private ownership than society gained by privatizing those resources.228 Even as the 
parent of the liberal theory of private property rights, Locke noted that private 
property was justified only “where there is enough, and as good left in common for 
 
221. Id. at bk. II., ch.2, §§ 6–7. 
222. Id. at bk. II, ch. 2, § 13; bk. II, ch. 3, § 21. 
223. Id. at bk. II, ch. 5, §§ 25–26. He included common resources such as water in a fountain, id. 
at § 29, and fish and wildlife, id. at § 30. 
224. Id. at § 26. 
225. An alternative, proposed by both Plato and later Thomas More, among others, was a Utopian 
society in which all wealth was owned collectively. See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 128, 519.  
226. LOCKE, supra note 213, bk. II, ch. 5, § 27 (“Whatsoever then he removes out of this state that 
Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes his Property”); id. at § 37 (individual ownership increases land productivity); see 
also Eric T. Freyfogle, Community and the Market in Modern American Property Law, in LAND, PROPERTY, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 382, 634 & nn.8–9 (John F. Richards, ed. 2002). 
227. Cf. Freyfogle, supra note 226, at 382, 388 (noting that recognition of intensified private land 
use resulted in loss of community and individual liberty values). 
228. Far from advocating purely individual rights, Locke argued that government was beneficial 
for the preservation of the “common good.” See LOCKE, supra note 213, bk. II, ch. 9, § 131. See also Alice 
Ingold, Commons and Environmental Regulation in History: The Water Commons Beyond Property and 
Sovereignty, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 425, 440 (2018) (noting that even in the “age of property,” 
the commons “stood out as an exception”). 
 Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law Vol. 10:1 
 
260
others,”229 that commons remain so by compact,230 and that governments have the 
authority to retain land in public ownership.231 Despite changing economies, 
individuals did not abandon hunting and fishing on common land. Moreover, 
commerce depended on navigable waters and other common “public highways.”232 
Allowing private property owners to monopolize public highways and certain other 
resources was inequitable233 and could do more to impair than to support growing 
and evolving economies.234  
This linkage between the public trust and Enlightenment natural law theory 
was also important to interpretations of Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forest 
by Coke and Blackstone, and the use of those ideas in the Colonies and in early 
judicial opinions in the American Republic. Coke framed the charters as 
reaffirmations of pre-existing, “ancient” English liberties, including rights to rely on 
public natural resources for subsistence and other purposes, at a time that was 
contemporaneous with early British settlements in North America.235 Blackstone 
merged that idea with Locke’s theories of natural rights, and Blackstone’s 
Commentaries were the primary vehicle through which those linked ideas reached 
lawyers and political activists in the North American colonies.236 Some scholars argue 
that Locke’s theory of property rights was directed more at evolving practices in the 
 
229. See LOCKE supra, bk. II, ch. 5, § 27. 
230. Id. at § 28. 
231. See id. at § 35. In this section, Locke asserts that public land is held in common by compact, 
but is protected by positive law. 
232. This explains the intensive focus in early American law on protection of navigable waters as 
public highways for common use. See, e.g., Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845); 
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410, 414 (1842); see generally Adler, supra note 125, at 
1684–86. 
233. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. L. REV. 1269, 1295 (1993) (noting 
that Locke bounded his theory of private property, as a matter of equity, by circumstances in which others 
have access to similar resources). 
234. See Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in 
Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 393, 400–01 (1991) (arguing that common access to some 
resources promotes greater “scale returns” and higher overall value); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the 
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 728–29 (1986) (citing 
socially optimal resource allocation as justification for public trust theory). 
235. See Turner, supra note 65, at 44–45. See also Dillon, supra note 55, at 98–101 (noting Coke’s 
view that English common law pre-dated the Norman conquest, and that Magna Carta merely reconfirmed 
those principles); Clark, supra note 73, at 266 (noting that public fishing rights in navigable waters 
predated Magna Carta, and the Charter merely eliminated the Crown’s ability to restrict those rights). 
236. See Turner, supra note 65, at 46 (noting that Blackstone was the standard text for apprentice 
lawyers in North America, and that for the colonists, “Magna Carta continued to be fundamental law, 
standing above both king and Parliament and unalterable by statute.”); Dillon, supra note 55, at 99 
(“Ultimately, it was Coke transmitted through Blackstone that brought the ‘mythic’ Magna Carta and 
Cokes ‘exalted conception of the common law’ to the colonies in North America.”). 
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North American colonies than at Britain, in which property rights were already 
secure.237 Moreover, Blackstone republished and re-invigorated the Forest Charter, 
principles of which were then adopted and cited by courts and attorneys in the United 
States.238  
The public trust doctrine reflects a societal determination, consistent with 
natural law, about what resources should remain in common to protect liberty and 
promote the common welfare. Resources such as the “air, the running waters, the sea 
and the seashore” were logical candidates for common access. Land can easily be 
parceled in ways that allows everyone to have a fair share for themselves. The same 
is not true for a river, in which privatization of one segment could allow only some 
individuals to ship their goods to market, or to charge others monopolistic fees to do 
so.239 The precise legal means of doing so, via active public ownership (res publicum) 
or through some legal concept of a commons (res communes) reflected particular 
positive law applications of the natural law principle that certain lands and resources 
were too valuable as a matter of common liberty to cede to private ownership. 
4. The Public Trust Doctrine as an Attribute of Sovereignty 
Courts routinely describe government ownership of public trust resources 
as an attribute of sovereignty.240 As emphasized by Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. 
Waddell: “[W]hen the revolution took place, the people of each state became 
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their 
navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use . . . .”241 This 
 
237. See Martti Koskenniemi, Sovereignty, Property and Empire: Early Modern English Contexts, 18 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 355, 380–81 (2017). 
238. See Robinson, supra note 62, at 320–22. 
239. See Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24 
ENV’T L. 1, 2, 6 (1994) (arguing that resources that are beyond anyone’s control, such as air and water, are 
“outside the comfortable range of property,” as are resources such as entire stocks of fish and wildlife that 
cannot be compartmentalized into individual parts); see also Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of 
Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 281, 309 (2002) (arguing that water is 
unsuitable for privatization); Epstein, supra note 18, at 415 (asserting that each river segment is worth 
little unless all are subject to common ownership). 
240. See, e.g., PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 656 U.S. 576, 589 (2012) (states hold title to beds 
of navigable waters “in their capacity as sovereigns”); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001) 
(ownership of lands submerged by navigable waters is “strongly identified with the sovereign power of 
government,” quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981)); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 286 (1997) (describing “the perceived character of submerged lands, a perception 
which underlies and informs the principle that these lands are tied in a unique way to sovereignty”); 
Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221 (1845) (providing rationale for state trust ownership 
under equal footing doctrine justified because new states have the “same rights of freedom, sovereignty, 
and independence” as existing states). 
241. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). See also Arnold v. Mundy, 6 
N.J.L. 1, 49 (N.J. 1821) (“the wisdom of [English] law has placed [trust resource] in the hands of the 
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has been true not only for navigable waters, but also for common resources such as 
wildlife242 and air.243 Legal scholars also note that the public trust doctrine has roots 
in sovereignty, implying that sovereign trust duties cannot lightly be altered and may 
not be eliminated.244  
Locke’s theory of government maintains that people themselves are 
sovereign and cede only those rights necessary to serve necessary governmental 
functions.245 One of those essential functions, hence a fundamental obligation of 
sovereignty, is to protect private property.246 We would not accept governmental 
failure to protect private property any more than we would accept its failure to 
protect us from foreign invasion. Locke’s justification for private property included 
several conditions designed to prevent some individuals or groups from 
monopolizing key resources, which would violate the tenet that government exists to 
maximize collective, not individual, freedom.247 Locke’s definition of the “property” 
government is obligated to protect is much broader than either the lay or legal 
concept of property suggests. It includes “Lives, Liberties, and Estates, which I 
[Locke] call by the general Name, Property.”248 Individuals would not have ceded a 
large portion of their freedom to the government to protect the rights of the few, 
meaning that government has as much of a sovereign obligation to protect common 
property as it does to protect private property. Natural law reasoning supports the 
idea that the sovereign has an obligation to enforce public trust resource protection 
for the common good.249  
Likewise, who is to regulate, manage, or protect common pool resources to 
ensure they are not overused or otherwise degraded or destroyed? As portrayed most 
famously by Garrett Hardin in The Tragedy of the Commons, unregulated common 
 
sovereign power, to be held, protected, and regulated for the common use and benefit”), 53 (“the people, 
through their legislatures, manage and regulate trust resources in their sovereign capacity.”). 
242. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 521 (1896) (control by the people “in their united 
sovereignty”). 
243. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (“This is a suit by a state for an 
injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the state has an interest independent of and 
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.”) 
244. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 3, at 125–42; Michael C. Blumm & Courtney Engel, Proprietary 
and Sovereign Public Trust Obligations: From Justinian to Hale to Lamprey to Oswego Lake, 43 VERMONT L. 
REV. 1 (2018); Torres & Bellinger, supra note 18, at 285–86. But see Lazarus, supra note 25, at 633 
(presenting competing perspective that public property basis for protecting natural resources is giving way 
to sovereign regulatory power). 
245. See supra Section I.E.3. 
246. See LOCKE, supra note 213, bk. II, ch. 9, §§ 123–24. 
247. See supra notes 250–53 and accompanying text. 
248. LOCKE, supra note 213, bk. II, ch. 9, § 123 (italics and capitalization in original). 
249. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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property incentivizes each individual to consume a greater portion of the resource 
because the individual reaps all of the resulting profits while accompanying damage 
to common resources is shared equally.250 Climate change is the most profound 
current example of that phenomenon, but history holds many others. 
Governments can adopt different positive law means to protect common 
trust resources. Government can assume formal title to a common resource and 
manage it accordingly.251 It can decree that certain resources, such as wildlife, are 
inherently incapable of private ownership, but that use of those resources can be 
regulated for the public benefit.252 It might allow for usufructuary property rights in 
defined portions of common resources such as water, but with ownership or public 
trust oversight held by the common government.253 The precise form chosen as a 
matter of positive law is less important than the proper assumption by the 
government of its sovereign obligation to manage and protect public trust resources. 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF NATURAL LAW FOR THE PAST AND FUTURE OF 
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Prior Appropriation identified several core principles against which to 
evaluate the legitimacy of claims asserted by western property rights advocates based 
on prior appropriation. Although these principles are not equally applicable to claims 
by environmental advocates based on the public trust doctrine, parallel analysis 
requires that all be analyzed here with respect to the public trust doctrine as well. 
These principles help to explain how the public trust doctrine developed in the past, 
but they also suggest guidelines for its future evolution.  
A. Temporal and Societal Context  
The first principle from Prior Appropriation is that natural law has not been 
a fixed concept throughout history. It reflects the political and social context of the 
time.254 Thus, assertions that natural law justifies extensions of prior appropriation 
doctrine or public trust doctrine, or that such extensions would upset longstanding 
 
250. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (“Freedom in a 
commons brings ruin to all . . . .”). 
251. This is the legal form used for navigable waters, in which English and American law 
distinguishes between jus publicum and jus privatum, with different associated rights and obligations. See 
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 286 (1997); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11–14 
(1894).  
252. This is what the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately decided with respect to wildlife. Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329–36 (1979).  
253. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).  
254. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 778–79.  
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legal expectations or contravene democratic principles, “must be analyzed and 
applied in our current political and social context, not through the lens of a past 
era.”255 
In the case of prior appropriation, as applied to grazing or other resources, 
federal positive law governing public lands makes perfect sense.256 Federal multiple-
use management of common resources reflects the current social and political context 
in which large segments of the public use public lands for recreation and other 
common uses, while smaller numbers of profit-seeking individuals and businesses use 
public lands for more traditional resource extraction purposes. To the extent that 
natural law is relevant to federal land policy, it justifies societal decisions to retain 
some land and resources in the public domain.257 U.S. positive law supports that 
regime. Thus, although natural law would also support making public grazing land 
available for appropriation, natural law ranch advocates bear the burden of 
convincing the key decisionmaker, Congress, to modify positive law to do so. 
Likewise, to the extent that the public trust doctrine has origins in natural 
law, it should be analyzed and applied through the lens of contemporaneous natural 
resource use and values. The applicable principle of natural law is that, in forming 
civil societies, individuals ceded to government the authority to make certain 
resources available for private property, but to reserve other resources for common 
use and protection.258 This applies regardless of whether one interprets natural law 
from a perspective of liberty,259 economic efficiency, or both.260 Collective freedom 
and economic welfare are both maximized by holding some resources in common 
rather than privatizing them. Different societies implement that concept through 
their positive law as appropriate to their circumstances, but natural law remains a 
tool to evaluate the justice of those choices. 
In early, sparsely settled societies, there may have been little or no need to 
use positive law to protect common resources that had been shared through local 
custom and practice.261 That changed as land and resource use intensified, as 
competition for resources increased, and as individuals or groups sought to 
monopolize what was formerly common.262 Thus, the Roman public trust doctrine 
evolved in response to conflicts caused when wealthy citizens built coastal villas that 
 
255. Id. 
256. See id. at 802–04. 
257. See supra Section I.E. 
258. See supra Section I.E. 
259. See Freyfogle, supra note 227, at 395. 
260. See Epstein, supra note 18, at 414–15. 
261. See Rose, supra note 239, at 13–14. 
262. See Freyfogle, supra note 227, at 386–88. 
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interfered with traditional access by local fishers.263 As manifested in Magna Carta, 
the Charter of the Forests, and in common law,264 the English public trust doctrine 
protected “ancient rights” to common resource access against the intrusion of the 
Norman and Angevin monarchs. Yet even in England, subsequent generations have 
modified and reinterpreted the principles inscribed in the Charter of the Forest to 
suit new values and conditions.265 The significant focus on navigable waters as the 
principle contested resource266 made sense for an island nation reliant on maritime 
commerce.267 The same was true in the British Colonies and later the United States, 
which depended heavily on navigable waters for travel and trade, for subsistence 
resources, and for national defense.268  
In the modern world, resource conflicts have changed and intensified. We 
face problems never before encountered, some of which could not have been 
imagined when we entered any particular social contract. Climate change is the 
clearest and most compelling current example, but it is only one of many with which 
courts asked to modify or extend the public trust doctrine have struggled in recent 
decades. Given the common law nature of the public trust doctrine, courts and 
legislatures are free to apply it to other appropriate resources so long as those 
applications are consistent with otherwise applicable principles of positive law in the 
jurisdiction.269 
In response to this challenge, both state and federal American courts 
recognized early in our history that narrow geographic limitations to the concept of 
navigability that may have applied in England were not appropriate to the geography 
of North America.270 More recently, courts in diverse U.S. jurisdictions have 
recognized that the public trust doctrine is grounded in broader principles than 
protection of the traditional “triad” of navigability doctrine resources (navigation, 
commerce, and fishing). In expanding public trust protections to include ecological 
and aesthetic resources and values, for example, the California Supreme Court wrote:  
 
 
263. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 49–51. 
264. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra note 115. 
266. See Russell, supra note 44, at 634–35 (describing ongoing controversy over Acts of Parliament 
that enriched aristocrats by enclosing commons at the expense of commoners). 
267. See Wilkinson, supra note 25; Adler, supra note 125.  
268. See Wilkinson, supra note 25; Adler, supra note 125. 
269. This includes the constitutional prohibition against taking private property without due 
process and just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See infra Section II.B. 
270. See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 458 (1851); Carson v. Blazer, 2 
Binn. 475 (Penn. 1810); Adler, supra note 125, at 1656–59. 
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There is a growing public recognition that one of the most 
important public uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within 
the tidelands trust—is the preservation of those lands in their 
natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for 
scientific study, as open space, and environments which provide 
food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably 
affect the scenery and climate of the area.271 
 
Public trust cases have involved other common resources that are explained 
by the same natural law reasoning, such as wildlife,272 wetlands,273 and public 
parklands.274 
The U.S. Supreme Court has enunciated similar principles regarding 
protection of the atmosphere and other common resources with respect to regional 
air pollution, but clothed in parens patriae language rather than the public trust 
doctrine.275 Extension of public trust principles to the atmosphere would appear to 
fit squarely within these principles. It is a common resource that is inappropriate for 
private ownership. It confers common economic and other welfare, including 
preservation of life itself. Allowing some interests to jeopardize atmospheric integrity 
impedes individual and collective liberty and welfare, and one the very ends of 
government Locke identified is “mutual preservation” of those collective values.276 
B. Duty to Obey Positive Law 
The second relevant principle from Prior Appropriation is that “individuals 
must respect and obey the positive law of the society in which they live, because that 
is the foundation on which all civil society is based.”277 That principle was particularly 
relevant to property rights asserted by natural law ranch advocates because they 
overtly asserted that they were not bound by federal law.278 Natural law ranch 
 
271. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
272. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522–29 (1896).  
273. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wisc. 1972).  
274. See Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966). 
275. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
276. See LOCKE, supra note 213, bk. II., ch. 9, § 123. See also id. at bk. II, ch. 1, §§ 3, 6 (admonishing 
that “no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions,” and that government 
power is designed to protect against violations of that principle); bk. II, ch. 9, § 130 (providing that people 
part with natural liberty “as the good, prosperity, and safety of the Society shall require”) (capitalization 
in original). 
277. Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 779. 
278. See id. at 743–45.  
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advocates are entitled to argue for changes in federal land law and policy consistent 
with their understanding of natural law, but unless they prevail in those arguments 
through legitimate political or judicial process, they either must obey the law or 
accept the legal consequences of their actions.279 Proponents of extension of the 
public trust doctrine and other fundamental environmental rights also assert that 
existing positive law is inadequate to protect their rights, however,280 and those 
claims should be evaluated according to the same principles. 
In the United States, individual reliance on theistic versions of natural law 
to violate positive law is also limited through the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment281 and the Oath or Affirmation Clause in Article VI.282 Religious 
doctrine cannot confer a legally enforceable source of natural law unless a principle 
is so universally accepted or independently enshrined in positive law that it has 
become the law of the land.283 Rather, the federal and state constitutions are the 
exclusive source of law governing judicial review of duly adopted legislation. Natural 
law principles, however, may guide cases not addressed directly by legislation or 
constitutional provisions, or help jurists fill in gaps in legislation or constitutional 
provisions.284 
Thus, to the extent that natural law ranch advocates rely on personal 
religious beliefs to justify property rights, those beliefs are not a valid source of legal 
rights. Congress rejected those assertions through legislation adopted under its 
Property Clause power, as did the federal courts in interpreting those statutes.285 
Some faith-based groups support environmental protection agendas,286 and scholars 
 
279. See id. at 756.  
280. See id. at 745.  
281. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
282. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.3.  
283. A clear example is that some of the Ten Commandments, such as “Thou shalt not kill” or 
“Thou shalt not steal” are universally recognized tenets of civil law, although subject to varying 
implementation. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 760–65. Early Puritan settlers recognized the 
distinction between those portions of the Decalogue that address an individual’s relationship to God as 
inappropriate for civil law implementation, and those portions that address an individual’s duties in a civil 
society, which can be the proper subject of civil law. See JOHN M. BARRY, ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN SOUL: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE BIRTH OF LIBERTY 206 (2012).  
284. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 770–78; Babcock, supra note 30.  
285. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 793-98. 
286. For example, Pope John Paul II released a statement, Peace with God Creator, Peace with All 
Creation, in which environmental protection is framed a moral issue where all are called upon to do their 
part. MESSAGE OF HIS HOLINESS POPE JOHN PAUL II, PEACE WITH GOD THE CREATOR, PEACE WITH 
ALL CREATION (1990), http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp
-ii_mes_19891208_xxiii-world-day-for-peace.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2020); For examples in other 
religious traditions, see, e.g.,  AMERICAN-BASED JEWISH ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, 
http://aytzim.org/resources/educational-materials/155abjeo (last visisted Aug. 22, 2020); 
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and others have analyzed religious texts regarding the extent to which their teachings 
support proper stewardship of natural resources.287 I know of no claims, however, 
that theistic principles should dictate environmental or natural resources law directly, 
and certainly not that they should override positive law.  
C. Manner of Implementation 
The third and final principle identified in Prior Appropriation is that the 
system of law adopted in our constitutional system of government dictates and limits 
the manner in which concepts of natural law may be used or asserted.288 This 
implicates both constitutional limits on government action, and institutional or 
process-based requirements designed to ensure accountability and democratic 
governance. 
1. Constitutional Limits 
In the case of the public trust doctrine, the key constitutional issue involves 
applicability of the provisions of the U.S. Constitution that prohibit unlawful taking 
of private property without due process and just compensation.289 As is true with 
virtually every other aspect of public trust law, this issue has been contested. Some 
scholars caution that public trust protection might limit applicability of the doctrine 
or require compensation to the extent that those protections impair private 
property.290 Others believe public trust protection is authorized under long-accepted 
background principles of law, either generally or with respect to specific categories 
of common property.291 
 
GREENMUSLIMS.ORG, https://www.greenmuslims.org/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2020); LDS EARTH 
STEWARDSHIP, https://ldsearthstewardship.org/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2020). 
287. See generally ARTHUR WASKOV, TORAH OF THE EARTH: EXPLORING 4,000 YEARS OF 
ECOLOGY IN JEWISH THOUGHT (Arthur Waskow, ed. 2000); see also David Horell & Anna Davis, 
Engaging the Bible in GCSE and A Level of Religious Studies: Environmental Studies as a Test Case, BRITISH J. 
RELIGIOUS EDUC. Vol. 36, No. 1, at 72, 78 (2014); Quiang Luo, Daoism and Environmental Sustainability: 
A Completely Different Way of Thinking, PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON 
SUSTAINABLE CITY REGION, at 164–171; Christopher Key Chapple, Hinduism, Jainism, and Ecology, THE 
FORUM ON RELIGION AND ECOLOGY YALE, http://fore.yale.edu/religion/hinduism/;  Donald K. 
Swearer, Buddhism and Ecology: Challenge and Promise, THE FORUM ON RELIGION AND ECOLOGY YALE, 
http://fore.yale.edu/religion/buddhism/.   
288. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 779–80. 
289. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. IV, § 1. See Grant, supra note 25. 
290. See Grant, supra note 25; Huffman, supra note 28, at 528, 558–59. 
291. See Rieser, supra note 234; Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: 
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1447–50 (1993); Freyfogle, 
supra note 233, at 1296–97; Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common 
Law, 15 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 247 (1996). 
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The takings issue has been mitigated to some extent by the familiar “bundle 
of sticks” concept of property law,292 under which public trust protection need not 
prevent privatization of land that contains common pool resources. For example, one 
can own a parcel of land through which a herd of deer migrates. Under American 
wildlife law, the landowner does not “own” the herd of deer, which is now considered 
an “unownable” resource under U.S. law.293 The landowner can, however, exercise 
the property right to limit access to private property for purposes of hunting those 
deer, leaving them available for hunting on public or other private lands. The 
landowner can also reduce individual deer to possession and ownership by 
successfully hunting them, subject to any applicable state regulations regarding 
season, bag limits, age and size, etc. Likewise, in the context of the public trust over 
navigable waters, American courts have accepted the distinction between jus privatum 
and jus publicum title to the same property, to serve different purposes; and the 
federal government retains a navigational servitude in those same waters.294  
Early American trust doctrine cases involving shellfish beds illustrate the 
utility of this fine-tuned approach to the tension between resources that have more 
value as a common pool and those that are more efficiently made available as private 
property. Wild shellfish collected in tidal waters fall within the geographic scope of 
the English common law public trust. Preserving those resources for common access 
promoted collective freedom and welfare, particularly in regions of Colonial America 
in which fishing and foraging for shellfish was essential to subsistence.295 Cases such 
as Arnold v. Mundy296 and Gough v. Bell,297 however, involved the rights of individuals 
to plant oysters in specified parcels of tidal lands for which title for other purposes 
had been granted to others. Those circumstances implicate the Lockean idea that 
resources should be available for private ownership so that individuals may reap the 
profits from their labor and skill in tilling the land and nursing their crops to harvest.  
Planting oysters in tidal waters falls in a grey area between those resources 
subject to natural law principles justifying private property and natural law principles 
justifying common access. That explains why courts struggled with the applicability 
of public trust principles to those facts and circumstances. It also explains the 
ultimate resolution that state legislatures should resolve such middle ground cases of 
public trust management as a matter of positive law, and as appropriate to the 
particular circumstances of that jurisdiction. Indeed, the resolution upheld by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Gough v. Bell was to allow exclusive oyster beds subject 
 
292. See Arnold, supra note 239, at 289–91 (explaining but critiquing “bundle of sticks” metaphor). 
293. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329–36 (1979). 
294. See Rieser, supra note 234, at 398 & n.27.  
295. See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 414 (1842). 
296. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821). 
297. Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441 (N.J. 1850). 
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to state regulation.298 That is consistent with the manner in which states regulate the 
harvesting of other fish and wildlife, and reflects a rational judgment about how to 
balance private property and public access to the common pool resource of tidal areas 
suitable for shellfish harvest.  
The issue becomes more challenging to the extent that government seeks to 
extend public trust protection to resources not formerly subject to protection, or that 
have not previously been recognized as part of the trust “corpus.” How takings 
jurisprudence applies to those assertions may depend on the degree to which the 
doctrine inhered in particular forms of property historically.299 For example, the 
Supreme Court has ruled that the federal navigation servitude is not subject to the 
strictures of the takings clause.300 Although the navigation servitude cases pre-date 
Lucas, they reflect that the servitude exists as a fundamental attribute of sovereignty 
that predates any private property rights to the beds of navigable waters. 
Indeed, Illinois Central involved the takings issue as an important but often-
neglected subsidiary issue. Arguably, the real dispute between the majority and the 
dissent involved takings rather than a fundamental dispute about American public 
trust law. Justice Field, who was “normally a staunch defender of individual liberty 
and private property,”301 sanctioned compensation to the extent that the railroad 
company incurred actual property losses as a result of the legislature’s withdrawal of 
portions of the original grant, and remanded for a determination of the company’s 
riparian rights to wharf out.302 In dissent, Justice Shiras did not disagree with the 
majority’s statement of public rights in navigable waters, but saw no immediate 
violation of public rights and would have required the legislature to wait to see if the 
railroad acted in derogation of those rights and to exercise eminent domain if it 
believed necessary.303 
Thus, one obvious solution to the takings problem would be for government 
to compensate landowners for any loss of property rights caused by affording public 
trust protection to a resource previously not deemed subject to the trust. By using 
eminent domain power the government would expand the trust corpus, just as 
government must use eminent domain to expand its land holdings to build a new 
road. That solution would be extremely expensive, however, presenting a large 
disincentive for budget-conscious governments and a tax-averse public to act. 
 
298. Id. at 456–61. 
299. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026–32 (1992) (holding that the 
takings issue turns on the nature and extent of property loss and the extent to which existing limitations 
to protect common interests restrict title as a “background principle” of law). A full analysis of the takings 
issue is beyond the scope of this article but has been addressed elsewhere. See Grant, supra note 25.  
300. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
301. See Epstein, supra note 18, at 423. 
302. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 439–57 (1892). 
303. Id. at 474 (Shiras, J., dissenting). 
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Property rights advocates would respond that this would pose a useful, if not 
essential, check on the tendency of government to expand public trust protections. 
Government would expand the trust corpus only if it believed that the value to the 
public was sufficient to incur the accompanying costs.  
Imposing this cost on government, however, arguably violates the whole 
idea of the public trust doctrine, particularly as informed by natural law. Professor 
Epstein noted that the failure of government to administer the public trust properly 
by allowing private use—particularly monopolistic use—of trust resources 
constitutes a kind of reverse eminent domain, an unlawful private taking of public 
property without due process or just compensation.304 If one accepts the idea that 
people never agreed to cede that portion of their liberty with respect to natural 
resources that are fundamental to life, health, and welfare, such as water and air or 
basic environmental integrity, why should the public need to “buy back” those 
resources from private property owners who, by virtue of having acquired other 
property rights, gain monopolistic or other significant control over them?  
The core problem, then, is distinguishing between those resources that 
should be available for private appropriation, and those intended to be reserved in 
common. As explained above, relying exclusively on those resources that have 
historically been protected by positive law does not solve the problem, and leads to 
inappropriately narrow results, because public trust law evolved only as needed to 
address particular problems relevant at particular times and in particular societies.305 
The challenge is where and how to apply the public trust doctrine to new, often 
unforeseen problems. This is directly analogous to the “Griswold problem” in Ninth 
Amendment jurisprudence.306 The Ninth Amendment may have reserved 
unenumerated rights that warrant constitutional protection, but if they are not 
enumerated, how are we to know what counts? The public trust component of the 
social contract may have reserved certain kinds of resources for common use and 
benefit, but how are we to know which count? 
Although the idea of an atmospheric public trust has generated considerable 
controversy,307 it actually seems to present one of the clearest cases for trust 
protection. That is not simply because “air” is mentioned expressly in the Institutes of 
Justinian. It is because the atmosphere is so clearly a fundamental and essential 
common resource that it is incapable of being divided for purposes of ownership. If 
navigable waterways merit public trust protection, how can the same not be true for 
the atmosphere? And to the extent that public trust protection is a sovereign 
 
304. See Epstein, supra note 18, at 419. 
305. See supra Section II.A. 
306. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 777–78. 
307. See supra note 3. 
 Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law Vol. 10:1 
 
272
obligation analogous to national defense or the protection of private property,308 
preventing catastrophic climate change appears to be a simple case rather than a close 
call. 
When the issues are not clear, the harder questions are who should decide 
what resources warrant trust protection, what level of protection to provide, and 
through what positive law methods. Those issues are addressed in the following 
section. 
2. Institutional and Process Limits 
One argument against the applicability of vague, unwritten concepts of 
natural law to confer such wide-reaching power in the face of changing circumstances, 
at least in the United States and other republican forms of government, is that it 
threatens principles of representative democracy and allows unbridled judicial 
activism.309 Reliance on natural law principles that are foundational to our concept 
of government to inform important decisions about law and policy, however, says 
nothing about who has the power to make those decisions, or when or under what 
circumstances. Important structural checks inherent in the separation of powers built 
into the U.S. Constitution limit the force of this critique.310  
First, judicial application of the public trust doctrine is subject to legislative 
discretion. In the case of the federal government’s residual authority to protect 
navigability, federal courts apply the federal navigational servitude doctrine, but 
defer to the plenary discretion of Congress in deciding which waterways require 
protection or improvement for purposes of navigability, and through what means.311 
Similarly, because the states retain sovereignty over traditional public trust property, 
state legislatures have discretion to dispose of trust properties so long as those grants 
are consistent with or designed to serve the purposes of the trust.312 Thus, state 
legislatures remain free to check inappropriate state court actions under the public 
 
308. See supra Section I.E.3. 
309. See Huffman, supra note 28; Cohen, supra note 28, at 252.  
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311. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913). 
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Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892).  
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trust doctrine.313 Whether the Ninth Amendment or other authority establishes a 
substantive floor on state public trust doctrine responsibility remains to be seen.314 
Second, legislative or executive branch actions pursuant to the public trust 
doctrine, or actions allegedly in violation of public trust principles, remain subject to 
judicial review in both federal and state courts (depending on where jurisdiction is 
found appropriate); and state judicial decisions are subject to review in the U.S. 
Supreme Court for violation of federal constitutional law. In particular, all 
interpretations and applications of the public trust doctrine are subject to checks 
under the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of many states. Given that any 
federal authority over public trust resources in navigable waters reflects a cession of 
those aspects of the trust affecting interstate and foreign commerce, any federal 
exercise of trust authority is bounded by the scope of the Commerce Clause.315 
Although federal control over navigability affecting private title to lands beneath 
navigable waters requires no compensation because that title is held subject to the 
federal navigation servitude, assertions of public trust authority over other public 
trust resources are subject to takings scrutiny, whether or not that scrutiny ultimately 
requires compensation.316 Finally, some state constitutions have express provisions 
defining public trust resources and the principles according to which they must be 
managed.317  
The answer to issues of institutional accountability in making and 
implementing public trust doctrine decisions is not to throw up our collective hands 
and abandon the trust. It is to ensure, as we do with analogous challenging public 
decisions, that our system of constitutional checks and balances works as intended. 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset of his classic The History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell 
asked: “Are there really laws of nature, or do we believe in them only because of our 
innate love of order?”318 We may ask a similar question: Is there really such a thing 
as natural law, or do we believe in it only because of our innate love of justice? 
Prior Appropriation assumed that natural law claims used to support the two 
doctrines were inconsistent and needed to be resolved. But the above analysis shows 
that the issues in Part I (Prior Appropriation) and Part II (The Public Trust 
 
313. Professor Babcock appears to agree in arguing that, even if the public trust doctrine is a “legal 
fiction,” it is a useful fiction in allowing judges to use common law to fill gaps in trust doctrine 
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Doctrine) merge. Both involve the degree to which, in forming civil societies, it was 
desirable to make all property and all resources available for private appropriation 
and exclusive use and control, or to retain some kinds of property and resources in 
common. As shown above, both the appropriation and public trust concepts are 
supported by the Lockean ideals that helped to inform the principles on which our 
constitutional system of government was based.  
In this context, natural law ranch advocates and public trust doctrine 
advocates make similar claims, from opposite sides of this spectrum. Ranch advocates 
argue for extension of prior appropriation doctrine to include property rights to 
grazing and other resources on public lands. Federal positive law has rejected that 
idea in favor of an alternative system of making those resources available through 
grazing leases and federal regulation to protect the common values of the resource. 
It is difficult to see how that balance violates any basic principle of natural law. 
Public trust advocates argue for an extension of the public trust doctrine to 
encompass the atmosphere to combat catastrophic global climate change, and other 
resources they deem essential to the common welfare. Positive law does not yet 
support all of those claims, but unlike the claims of natural law ranch advocates, 
neither does it preclude them. Although those claims may pose difficult policy 
choices, they are consistent with, if not fully supported by, principles of natural law. 
Thus, the natural law underpinnings of the public trust doctrine allow 
flexibility in the manner in which a state or other jurisdiction interprets the scope of 
the doctrine (the resources to which it applies) and the manner in which the trust is 
administered (who may access resources and under what conditions). So long as made 
consistently with constitutional and other applicable positive law in the jurisdiction, 
those judgments can change over time as circumstances change and as knowledge and 
understanding progress. Conceptually, this is no different than other ways in which 
different jurisdictions implement natural law differences as appropriate to their 
circumstances and community values but bound by a unifying minimum principle. 
The idea of an atmospheric public trust is one good example, and perhaps 
the most important example of our times, of inherent flexibility in the public trust 
doctrine. In accepting early in history that “the air” was a shared resource essential 
to the welfare of all of humanity, neither the Romans nor those who conceptualized 
the English common law doctrine could have foreseen the dramatic rise in 
greenhouse gas emissions and the impact it would have on the atmosphere. The 
sovereign obligation to protect and manage the collective resource, remains, however, 
despite drastically changing circumstances. Indeed, that obligation is arguably at its 
highest when those changes jeopardize the resource—and human welfare—so 
catastrophically. 
 
